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Executive Summary
In 2012, the National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU) 
undertook an exploratory, multi-method study about the 
implications of the Excellence in Research Australia (ERA) 
exercise and measures of research performance for Australian 
university staff. This study relied upon research conducted 
between April and September 2012, involving: 
•	 A national survey of 39 senior research administrators 
about the use of ERA and the use of indicators of research 
performance at universities around Australia; 
•	 Eight recorded and de-identified focus groups at four 
institutions, and eleven recorded and non-recorded 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews with participants 
from five institutions, the recorded sample totalling 50 
participants; and 
•	 An NTEU workshop in Melbourne that focused upon the 
experiences of 35 Early Career Researchers (ECR) and 
Academics (ECA). 
The study found that whatever concerns university staff have 
had about the robustness and probity of the ERA instrument, 
a pressing concern is what the ERA will be ultimately used for, 
as the ERA has been integrated into more intense modes of 
university managerialism. Furthermore, greater investment 
through the Sustainable Research Excellence (SRE) program 
will have important implications for Australian universities 
as workplaces integral to the creation of new knowledge, 
as was perceived by participants in this study. The policy 
settings underpinning the ERA and its use directly impact 
upon the confidence of university researchers in the ERA, as 
well as their very capacity to undertake broad and diverse 
types of research. 
The ERA exercise is a research evaluation system (RES) 
that has sought to generate a comprehensive picture of 
the kind and quality of research conducted in Australian 
tertiary education institutions, by reviewing the breadth 
and scale of research undertaken at 41 eligible institutions.1 
The completion of the Australian Research Council’s (ARC) 
2012 ERA National Report in late 2012 means that the 2012 
rankings will be used as a basis to allocate funding through 
the SRE program and potentially, in the future, through the 
Research Training Scheme (RTS).2 
For the vast majority of Australian academics and researchers, 
during the development and conduct of the ERA process it 
has not been clear how the funding mechanisms attached to 
the ERA would operate or what proportion of block funding 
was intended to be tied to the assessment of research quality. 
Whether the ERA is even suited to operate as the basis for the 
allocation of RTS funding has not been robustly addressed 
in the evaluation of its methodology.3 The key problem is 
that there are uncertain implications for researchers once 
the interdependence between the assessment instrument 
and the funding mechanism is established, in terms of its 
impact upon what researchers do, and thus acceptance by 
the sector.4 
Important structural contexts have undermined the 
development of clear, articulate understandings of what 
the ERA is meant to do. Firstly, the responsibility for the 
relationship between the Research Evaluation System (RES) 
and the Performance-based Research Funding System 
(PRFS) is segmented between the ARC and Department 
of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary 
Education (DIISRTE) (formerly DIISR). The former has 
focused upon ERA’s development and implementation. The 
latter has had responsibility for developing the SRE and the 
potential relationship of ERA to other funding mechanisms. 
The bifurcation between assessment instrument and funding 
allocation is evident through differences in its stated 
objectives, especially in the addition of the RTS to the 2012 
ERA Submission Guidelines.5 Secondly, public discourse 
has privileged the operation of the assessment instrument 
above the funding mechanism/s. While there has been open 
discussion (and criticism) about confidence of the sector in 
the ERA, there has been little robust public debate about the 
potential funding mechanisms.
The qualitative research conducted to support this study has 
highlighted that lack of clarity about the ERA’s purpose has at 
one level suspended dimensions of criticism, but at another 
has undermined the confidence of Australian academics 
and researchers. Amongst the focus groups and workshops 
conducted, the ERA process was consistently conflated with 
perceived government policy priorities, and even more 
disturbingly, the practices at various institutions that have 
either sought to manipulate the ERA outcomes, or drawn 
upon ERA indicators in the performance management of 
staff. This includes the formal use of the ERA journal rankings 
for over a year after being abandoned (because of its misuse 
by institutions), and in spite of efforts by the ARC to ensure 
it is no longer used.
Along with the sporadic interest of the Australian media in 
this issue, the qualitative research supporting this Report 
demonstrates that potential or actual change framed by the 
desire to maximise research performance funding through 
ERA has already occurred at a number of levels:
•	 Institutional and management behaviours and practices - 
from the institution-wide down to the intra-departmental 
level, in both formal and informal ways.
•	 The ways professional associations, disciplines and 
other professional groupings that can be generalised as 
‘communities-of-practice’ function.
•	 The capacity for university staff to exercise not only 
autonomy, but basic precepts of freedom of intellectual 
inquiry.
•	 Career pathways - ranging from the opportunity for 
graduate students to commence higher degree research 
to the career progress of early and mid-career researchers.
•	 The character, breadth and inter-disciplinarity of Australian 
research, and in important instances, the prospects for 
translational science and policy-oriented research.
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The lack of quality information amongst academics and 
researchers ranging from early career through to senior and 
executive roles, and the conflation of the integrity of the 
assessment instrument with the perverse consequences it 
has engendered, poses a risk to the confidence of the sector 
in ERA. More importantly, institutional manipulation and 
misappropriation of the ERA poses a risk to the integrity of 
both the ERA assessment instrument and the SRE funding 
mechanism.
In the recent history of research quality assessment in 
Australia both the ERA and its predecessor the Research 
Quality Framework (RQF) were intended to operate as 
instruments that could assess the quality of research 
produced in Australian universities. Though in its early 
days the ERA was heralded over the RQF by the sector for 
a number of reasons, the aims of the proposed ERA were 
identical to its predecessor in at least one important respect. 
Government and policy-making circles had long considered 
the prospects of introducing a quality assessment instrument 
to ameliorate perverse signals ingrained by preceding 
research funding policy. Funding allocation formulae were 
commonly portrayed as pushing universities to treat research 
in economic terms, and to privilege quantity over quality in 
the publication of research.6
Dating back to the introduction of the Unified National 
System (UNS) in 1989 and the establishment of the ARC, 
a modern feature of Australian research funding policy 
has been the allocation of research funding according to 
performance-based formulae. Integral to the competitive 
grants administered by the ARC and NHMRC has been 
the development of performance-based funding within the 
operating grants of universities, seeking to both stimulate 
and reward the non-salary components of research and 
research training. The Australian system of research funding, 
divided largely between performance-based research block 
grants and competitive research grant programs, is described 
as a ‘dual support system’. 
Since 1989, successive funding programs have relied upon 
research performance indicators that could neither identify, 
nor target funding to, areas where the quality of Australian 
research had been objectively demonstrated.7 This did not 
change as research block funding became formula-based in 
1995, as the number of Research Block Grants multiplied, 
or as the proportion of discretionary funding available to 
universities declined.8 Following the establishment of the 
ERA assessment instrument, the SRE scheme has become 
the first funding mechanism introduced with the intention of 
rewarding research quality.9 
In certain quarters it has been an implicit assumption that the 
ERA, like its predecessor the RQF, would modify the basis 
of research funding. In 2005, then Minister for Education, 
Brendan Nelson, called for the RQF to redistribute not only 
the entirety of the Institutional Grant Scheme (IGS), but 
also 50% of the RTS.10 In 2009, the Labor Government’s 
ten-year innovation blueprint Powering Ideas asserted that 
both the ERA and SRE would be linked to sectoral change, 
with additional funding being used to drive structural 
reform within institutions and across the sector.11 In March 
2011, the Minister for Research and Innovation, Kim Carr, 
explicitly wedded ERA to the allocation of the SRE and 
the RTS.12 This became part of the intended use of ERA in 
2012,13 and was further flagged in DIISRTE consultations in 
late 2011.14
As statutory organisations dependent upon public funding, 
encouraged through quasi-market settings to compete with 
one another, it is apparent that when performance indicators 
are introduced as a basis to allocate competitive funding 
(no matter how small) they will be used by universities to 
maximise revenue, and in doing so they retain the capability 
of seriously impacting upon both the university workplace 
and Australia’s ‘research fabric’.15 While the ERA currently 
distributes a very small proportion of the overall Research 
Block Grants (60% of the Threshold 2 allocation or almost 
$60m in 2012-13), it is having an increasing effect upon 
institutional behaviour. Though the allocation of funding 
establishes a driver for systemic change, it is also apparent 
that the introduction of any assessment instrument would 
modify some behaviours through reputational competition 
alone.16 
Though there will undoubtedly be efforts to measure 
Australian research quality through other assessment 
methodologies, the ERA will not be conducted until 2015.17 
With the 2012-13 Mid Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 
(MYEFO) delaying the full implementation of the SRE 
program, over $300 million in funding will be denied from 
supporting the indirect costs of research in the sector for the 
next three years. More importantly this means that support 
for the indirect costs of research will remain well below 50 
cents in the dollar. Nonetheless, the SRE, and potentially 
the RTS, will be annually distributed partly on the basis of 
ERA scores, and potentially until a time in which a quality 
assessment exercise is conducted again. 
The fact that university research relies upon public investment 
means that the Australian public should also expect that 
the policy objectives are demonstrable, transparent, 
and seek to minimise systemic risk. In the international 
literature, numerous studies highlight that a fundamental 
component of the establishment of an RES is ‘assessing 
the assessment’.18 In addition, the substantial international 
literature demonstrates that the implications for ‘research 
actors’ and the ‘constellation’ of research within a national 
system is critical to the conduct of research quality evaluation 
‘in its proper context’.19
The nature and effect of the interdependence between 
assessment instruments, funding allocation and institutional 
responses must be a primary concern for planning in relation 
to research funding policy. 
Conclusions and implications
The research presented in this report leads one to draw a 
number of important conclusions and implications about the 
further development of the ERA as an instrument designed 
to assess the quality of research at Australian universities. In 
order to minimise the adverse impact that the ERA itself has 
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upon institutional behaviour, the NTEU would contend that 
there is the need for:
•	 A comprehensive independent review of the ERA’s impact 
on institutional behaviour and its implications for the 
allocation of government resources, compliance costs, 
research careers and freedom of intellectual inquiry. 
•	 A review of the operation of the ERA in the context of the 
principles outlined in the National Research Investment 
Plan (NRIP). In particular, it should ensure the ERA is not 
inconsistent with Action 7 of the NRIP which addresses 
structural issues associated with research careers in higher 
education and provide measures to make these careers 
more attractive. 
•	 An examination of the direct costs to government and 
the ARC in administering the ERA as well as the direct 
and indirect costs imposed on institutions and individual 
researchers in complying with the ERA.
•	 Universities to develop policies that promote and protect 
intellectual freedom consistent with their missions as 
universities as required by the Higher Education Support 
Act (2003).
•	 The development of a comprehensive communication 
strategy that engages the entire research community and 
includes easily accessible and plain language information 
about the operation of ERA aimed specifically at staff 
new to the Australian higher education system including 
early career researchers, research support staff and staff 
involved in managing the ERA at their institutions.
•	 The development of ERA peer networks based on ERA 
discipline clusters, which would be independent of 
individual university structures, and be responsible for 
bridging gaps in communication in relation to assessment 
processes followed in different discipline groups.
•	 Greater use to be made of the ERA research by publishing 
as much of the non-confidential material as possible to 
showcase the quality of Australian research.
•	 Ensuring eligible researchers have provided consent as 
to how and where their research is assigned including in 
relation to the weights assigned to different FoR codes in 
multi-disciplinary research.
•	 Assurances to be obtained from universities that they will 
no longer use the now discarded ERA journal rankings 
and other research metrics in relation to staff:
•	 Appointments
•	 Probation
•	 Promotion
•	 Performance appraisal or management, and/or
•	 Workload management.
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The NTEU represents the professional and industrial 
interests of over 27,000 staff employed in Australian tertiary 
education. Our membership is comprised of academic, 
research, professional, administrative, technical and other 
general staff employed at Australian universities and other 
tertiary education institutions. This report is the result of 
an exploratory, multi-method study conducted by the 
NTEU National Policy & Research Unit about the harmful 
implications of the Excellence in Research Australia (ERA) for 
publicly funded university research and Australian university 
staff.
The NTEU has a long-standing interest in the ERA assessment 
exercise, providing responses on aspects of the design of 
the instrument and funding mechanisms since 2007. This has 
included the following submissions:
•	 The Inquiry on the Higher Education Legislation 
Amendment (2007 Measures No.1) Bill 2007.
•	 The Australian Research Council’s ERA Inquiry, June 2008. 
•	 The Sustainable Research Excellence in Universities Issues 
Paper, 31 August 2009.
•	 The Australian Research Council’s ERA Consultation, 
March 2011.
•	 The Options for the Inclusion of ERA in SRE Funding 
Allocation Model, September 2011.
This has also included participation on the Research 
Workforce Strategy Advisory Group (RWSAG), first convened 
in June 2011 to review the development of quality standards 
and issues relevant to the review of the Research Training 
Scheme (RTS).
The NTEU’s concerns about the professional interests of 
members in relation to the ERA began in late 2009. Some of 
these concerns were acknowledged by government in May 
2011, when Minister Kim Carr abandoned the ERA journal 
rankings, stating that the rankings were being ‘deployed 
inappropriately within some quarters of the sector’ and in 
ways that reflected ‘a poor understanding of the actual role 
of the rankings’.20 After urging the Minister in October 2010 
and the ARC in August 2011 to conduct an independent 
and comprehensive analysis of the implications of ERA for 
the sector and university staff, the NTEU proceeded with 
exploratory research of its own.
The NTEU National Council in October 2011 requested that 
the ERA be monitored to evaluate:
•	 The differential effect upon the eight discipline clusters.
•	 The effects within disciplines and Field of Research (FoR) 
codes.
•	 The effects upon university staff, including early career 
and research staff, and in relation to staff appointments 
and promotion processes.
When the research began, the NTEU was already aware 
of situations within the sector in which the ERA had 
been instrumental in enabling universities to restrictively 
manage the research performance of staff. Responses to a 
national survey in June 2012 about the ERA and research 
performance prompted a widening of the kinds of concerns 
originally intended for the study. Subsequently, what began 
as an evaluation of the impact of the ERA upon university 
staff shifted to a study that sought to explore change in 
institutional behaviour and practices in relation to research 
performance, especially where intensified through the ERA 
process.21 
1.1 Literature on ERA exercise
In the literature that has emerged in the last four years, 
scholars have made important contributions in relation to 
exploring and unpacking the implications of the ERA for the 
Australian tertiary education sector, from tertiary education 
specialists to academics researching within their respective 
institutions, disciplines and ‘communities of practice’.22 
A substantial proportion has been published as editorials 
and articles reviewing the development of the ERA exercise 
from disciplinary perspectives.23 These studies range 
from legal scholarship to psychology,24 from journalism to 
information systems,25 from commerce to the humanities.26 
These studies also cross a range of technical concerns from 
the design of the ERA instrument and its variegated reliance 
upon expert review, bibliometrics and esteem indicators, 
to the ERA journal rankings and their implications for the 
character and diversity of Australian research. They include 
warnings around how the nature of research might change 
because of the ERA design, including in terms of research 
that is predominantly:
•	 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander focused
•	 Interdisciplinary
•	 Policy-related
•	 Published in a foreign language
•	 Creative arts-based, and
•	 Area-focused. 
The Australian Universities’ Review (AUR) has also provided 
important contributions ranging from analysis of the ERA 
methodology to effects of the ERA on disciplinary groups.27 
Much of the criticism that arose through the focus groups 
about the robustness and probity of the ERA instrument are 
strongly reflected in the aforementioned publications, and 
it is not the intention of this study to attempt to recreate 
research that explores differential effects within the Field of 
Research (FoR) clusters or codes. 
Some of the most relevant prior scholarship focuses upon 
the purpose and use of research evaluation systems, with a 
number of articles attuned to the culture of audit that has 
expanded with the emergence of the ERA and the unfolding 
of ‘gaming‘ practices amongst academics, research 
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managers and institutions.28 As Cooper and Poletti have 
argued, ‘the transformative capacity of auditing measures 
such as the journal ranking scheme that constitutes the heart 
of the ERA threatens to produce a number of perverse or 
dysfunctional reactions within the academic community that 
threaten to undermine research quality in the long-term’.29 
Other relevant scholarship has questioned the rationale in 
linking the identification of research quality to the allocation 
of government funding. As stated by Calver, ‘The linkages 
between achievement, recognition and reward have the 
potential to shape the research priorities and agendas of 
institutions and individual researchers’.30 
Prior scholarship has been particularly strong in scrutinising 
this in relation to the now defunct ERA journal rankings. In 
fact the majority of the literature and the warnings about the 
misuse of the ERA is focused upon the ERA journal rankings. 
For instance, Spongberg considered that the future of 
interdisciplinary feminist research was dire ‘given that the 
ERA lists will eventually be used to determine funding of 
research in Australia’.31 
Others have observed that the Department has displayed a 
lackadaisical approach to defining the funding instruments. 
In considering the government’s attempts to develop 
funding policy, Macintryre argued, ‘These consequences 
have clear implications for the ERA methodology. It is one 
thing to produce a dashboard of indicators for research 
performance in a particular field of research, another to 
arrive at rankings that will determine the future of that field 
at an institution’.32 These views presage the perspectives 
reflected in this report.
What is open to further consideration is the extent to which 
the ERA assessment imposed upon Australian researchers 
will result in positive versus negative adaptive behaviour, 
and the extent to which any kind of adaptive behaviour is 
constrained either by particular design elements of the 
ERA instrument, or the adaptation of universities to this 
performance-oriented environment.   
1.2 Methodology
Between April and September 2012, the NTEU conducted 
an exploratory, multi-method study that included: 
•	 A national survey of 39 senior research administrators 
about the use of ERA and the use of indicators of research 
performance at universities around Australia (Table 1.1).
•	 Eight recorded and de-identified focus groups at four 
institutions, and eleven recorded and non-recorded 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews with participants 
from five institutions, the recorded sample totalling 50 
participants (see Table 1.2).
•	 An NTEU workshop in Melbourne that focused upon the 
experiences of 35 Early Career Researchers (ECR) and 
Academics (ECA) (see Table 1.3). 
The purpose for utilising a range of data collection methods 
has been to triangulate and thus cross verify the perspectives, 
subjectivities and concerns of interview and focus group 
participants.
1.2.1  National Survey on 
Approaches to ERA and 
Research Performance 
Measures
Between April and June 2012, an NTEU national survey was 
addressed to 39 Deputy Vice Chancellors Research (DVC-Rs) 
as the senior officers responsible for research policy at their 
institution. The survey asked questions about the institutions’ 
policies on ERA journal rankings and the use of research 
metrics. 28 institutions (almost 70%) provided some kind 
of reply, with eleven not acknowledging any contact (see 
Table 1.1). A list of the questions sent to these individuals is 
provided at APPENDIX A.  
Table 1.1: Sample of institutional responses to NTEU’s national survey
Did not acknowledge 
receipt of email
Declined to respond to 
survey
Responded without 
answering specific 
questions
Responded to questions
ACT ANU; UC
NSW CSU; SCU; UoW Macquarie; Newcastle; 
UNE; UTS; UWS
UNSW; USyd
NT CDU
QLD Bond; QUT; USQ; USC JCU CQU; Griffith; UQ
SA UniSA Adelaide; Flinders
TAS UTAS
VIC La Trobe; Monash Deakin; Swinburne RMIT Ballarat; Melbourne; VU
WA Murdoch Curtin; ECU; UWA
Multi-state ACU Notre Dame
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Out of the 28 universities that acknowledged the survey 
invitation, five declined to respond to the survey and four 
provided replies that did not explicitly answer the survey 
questions. In the case of Swinburne University, the DVC-R 
referred the NTEU to an article he had published in The 
Conversation, but did not state how Swinburne’s research 
policy impacted upon academic promotions.33 In the 
case of Murdoch University, the Branch identified that the 
DVC-R was relatively new and the university had only just 
established a Research Development Committee to consider 
possible approaches to research management. At the 
University of Southern Queensland, the DVC-R had left and 
the NTEU is still awaiting a response from the new DVC-R. 
It is important to note that where the university response 
was not comprehensive, those communications often came 
from someone other than a DVC-R, such as Directors of 
Human Resources, itself indicating that there are important 
staffing implications in the development and use of research 
performance metrics.
1.2.2  Focus groups and in-depth 
interviews
NTEU conducted focus groups at universities in Victoria 
and the ACT, and utilised a combination of qualitative focus 
group methods.34 The focus group design was originally 
segmented across three groups of staff:
•	 Teaching and Research academics in ongoing employment 
(T&R)
•	 Research only staff (academic or general) (RO)
•	 Teaching only or teaching focused staff (TO)
Focus group design remained reliant on non-probability 
sampling and participants were not selected on the basis 
of the representativeness of the group. Though originally 
intended to segment on the basis of these three categories, 
the overwhelming interest of T&R academics made 
segmentation difficult, and all focus groups became open to 
academic and research staff. 
There was no interest in selecting participants other than 
on the basis of the basic criteria, although the recruitment 
process deliberately sought to include non-members, 
combining emails through NTEU Branch emails lists, cold 
calling, and in some instances distribution through university 
email lists. Nonetheless, the methods of recruitment tended 
to attract participants who were members, and in more senior 
career positions. With the recruitment process, opportunities 
to conduct focus groups arose at smaller workplaces not 
located on the main campuses of universities. Three focus 
groups were conducted away from the main or major campus 
Table 1.2: NTEU focus groups and in-depth interview sample
Count Count
Gender
Male 25
Class
Level A 3
Female 25 Level B 12
NTEU Member
NTEU Member 45 Level C 8
Non-member 5 Level D 7
Academic/General
Academic 44 Level E 14
General 5 General 3
Other/Unknown 1 Other/Unknown 3
Work Function
T&R 39
Discipline Cluster
PCE 0
TO 1 HCA 6
RO 8 EE 2
Other/Unknown 2 EHS 12
Discipline Type
HASS 25 EC 5
STEM 19 MIC 3
Other/Unknown 6 BB 1
Age
Under 20 0 MHS 14
20-29 0 Other/Unknown 7
30-39 5 Total 50
40-49 9
50-59 16
60-69 13
Over 69 1
Other/Unknown 6
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of each institution. All focus groups were between 45 and 
69 min in length. To assist in honing discussion on the day, 
a half-page of discussion points was circulated in advance 
of each focus group. A list of the questions sent to these 
individuals is provided at APPENDIX B.  
In undertaking the focus groups, opportunities arose 
for individual interviews to be conducted that provided 
different kinds of expert information about the nature of 
university adaptation to the emerging research performance 
environment. These were focused primarily at research 
managers and administrators in senior and executive 
positions. While supplementary to the focus group method, 
these interviews were an important component of the 
sample, providing more nuanced and descriptive information 
about university research management processes. Interviews 
ranged from 45 minutes to 2 hours long. All recorded 
interviews and focus groups were de-identified, and bolded 
names used in this report are aliases.
A significant proportion of the findings contained in this 
study collect the perceptions, narratives and attitudes across 
this sample (see Table 1.2). The study demonstrates that 
qualitative approaches have particular sensitivity to exploring 
social processes and phenomena in Australian universities 
that are sensitive in nature.35
1.2.3  NTEU ECR Workshop on ERA 
Because the focus group sample had a tendency toward 
highly engaged mid-career and senior staff, many of whom 
were able to demonstrate expert knowledge about tertiary 
education policy, research evaluation systems, and the 
operation and implications of the ERA process on their 
institutions, the bias meant an under-representation of more 
junior research and academic staff.  To address concerns 
about the integrity of focus group data, the NTEU ran a two-
hour workshop with NTEU Victorian Division in August 2012, 
focusing on concerns of ECRs and ECAs. The workshop was 
aimed at 20 to 35 people who defined themselves as ECRs 
or ECAs from across greater Melbourne (see Table 1.3). 
In the workshop, participants were divided into six groups 
with the intent of collecting comparable information. The 
findings from the small group discussions amplified attitudinal 
concerns depicted in the focus groups, in particular concerns 
about the quality of information and professional anxiety 
about the implications of research performance expectations 
upon career pathways. 
The promotion of the event again depended upon the 
support of NTEU university-based branches but also relied 
heavily upon the support of member and non-member early 
career advocates at various institutions, and more intense 
use of social media promotion. In the end, the workshop 
was over-subscribed and hosted 35 workshop participants 
from 7 of the 9 universities in Victoria. The largest number 
of participants were from La Trobe University, followed by 
Melbourne and Victoria University.
Table 1.3: NTEU ECR Workshop sample
Count Count
Gender
Male 9
Discipline Type
HASS 23
Female 26 STEM 12
NTEU Member
NTEU Member 14 Other/Unknown 0
Non-member 21
Contract
Ongoing 11
Academic/General
Academic 28 Contract 13
General 3 Casual 4
Other/Unknown 4 Other/Unknown 7
Work Function
T&R 17 Total 35
TO 1
RO 10
Other/Unknown 7
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The ERA exercise represents the first research quality 
assessment process to be fully conducted with the Australian 
tertiary education sector. Soon after the Labor Government 
was elected to office in 2007, the Minister for Research and 
Innovation, Kim Carr, declared that the Coalition’s Research 
Quality Framework (RQF) would be discontinued, the ERA 
exercise would commence in its place, and the ARC would 
be tasked with responsibility for its development and 
implementation. By the end of 2012, Australia completed 
the second full ERA assessment exercise. To understand 
the rationale for the ERA it is necessary to situate it amidst 
the broader performance-based research funding policy 
environment. 
2.1 Overview of Australian 
research funding policies 
and performance funding 
post-Dawkins
A rich scholarly literature exists in relation to the history of 
performance based funding and its relationship with research 
in Australia.36 In an attempt to streamline this narrative, the 
impetus of performance based research funding in Australia 
can be claimed to have two major turning points. The first 
was the introduction of the Dawkins reforms that led to 
the Unified National System (UNS) under the Hawke Labor 
Government. In the late 1980s this represented the first major 
shift towards market-based public policy in Australian tertiary 
education and also created a unitary system of performance-
based funding.37
Before the Dawkins reforms, Commonwealth funding 
in relation to research was mainly allocated through the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (CTEC), 
a statutory body established in 1977 with the purpose of 
advising the relevant Minister about tertiary education 
funding for the direct costs of teaching and research.38 
Until 1987 a binary divide had existed between the ways 
research-oriented universities and institutes and colleges 
of advanced education (CAE) were funded. Also until 1987 
under the Minister for Education, Susan Ryan, alternative 
funding mechanisms were not on the cards.39 By early 1987, 
the Australian Science and Technology Council (ASTEC), a 
statutory body providing advice to government specifically 
on science and technology, had delivered a report advising 
the Hawke Government about the inadequacy of research 
funding arrangements and proposed greater allocation of 
funding through competitive grants processes conducted by 
a more independent ARC.40 
The Dawkins reforms delivered greater public investment 
on a rolling triennial basis beginning in 1989-91, with a 
portion of the operating grants to universities becoming 
administered through competitive programs such as the 
ARC and NHMRC. These bodies would be the vehicles for 
achieving selectivity and concentration of research. Dawkins 
also introduced the ‘relative funding model’ as a basis to 
adjust to the new system and ensure the old CAEs benefited 
from a more equitable funding base, providing equal funding 
for functions carried out by institutions irrespective of type. 
This led to the development of the Research Quantum’s 
Composite Index (Ci).41
Under Dawkins research funding would be distributed 
through three major mechanisms:
•	 Program specific funding distributed by the ARC and 
others.
•	 Support for research training made on the basis of 
enrolments as well as Australian Postgraduate Research 
Awards (APRA).
•	 The Research Quantum (RQ). 
Reforms around performance based research funding would 
be the subject of ongoing review and change. By 1995 the 
Research Quantum, which was originally allocated only on 
the basis of success in attracting operating grants, changed 
to the Composite Index to reflect the increased scale and 
complexity of research, by incorporating performance 
indicators that measured the number of publications and 
research degree completions. 
Nonetheless, the Dawkins reforms established a policy 
framework that has in important ways endured beyond 
specific funding programs or performance indicators. 
According to the Green Paper, the tertiary education system 
needed to be funded on the basis of public accountability 
requirements, performance indicators were necessary to 
ensure this accountability, and the block grant funding system 
should be modified so that a proportion of the operating 
grants of universities were allocated on a competitive basis.42 
It represented a ‘revolution’ in the direction of tertiary 
education funding by identifying contestability as a basis 
to encourage efficiency in the allocation of resources by 
institutions. This also represented a system of allocation on 
the basis of an institution’s research performance dependent 
upon the preparation by institutions of research management 
plans and the use of return data (in particular, research 
income and publications) and other data collected as part 
of the Higher Education Research Data Collection (HERDC).
The second major turning point was the Coalition 
Government’s 1999 Knowledge and Innovation policy 
statement, following the West and Willis Reviews.43 
The Coalition’s engagement in tertiary education was 
characterised by a range of important events, such as a 
significant cut in public sources of funding from 1996, and 
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an escalation in the proportion of performance based block 
funding. However, the Knowledge and Innovation policy 
statement is important because it proposed a performance-
based approach to all research block funding. This became 
articulated through two performance-based schemes, 
the Institutional Grants Scheme (IGS) that replaced the 
Research Quantum, and the Research Training Scheme 
(RTS). Universities would also be obliged to develop more 
transparent Research and Research Training Management 
Plans that reported on research performance as part of their 
educational profiles.
It is notable that concerns about the introduction of 
performance indicators have arisen throughout the existence 
of these policy frameworks. For instance, Marginson and 
Considine considered that the RQ was becoming the primary 
measure for the research standing of institutions and that 
institutions began to focus on the activities that generated the 
most Quantum allocation, a focus that was heavily weighted 
toward research income rather than research activity (80% 
of the total).44  The RQ would elicit concerns about perverse 
incentives that privileged research-intensive universities, and 
disciplines in which research was more expensive (such as 
the sciences).
Under both the Labor and Coalition Governments’ funding 
programs, a university’s share of research publications was 
also one measure that determined the proportion of funding 
it received, but the measure only identified the volume of 
work produced.  It was perceived that these publications 
pushed a greater bias towards certain kinds of research 
output, narrowed concepts of research by focusing on 
publications, and towards the publication of quantity versus 
quality. Research increasingly demonstrated that while the 
quantity of research was increasing, it was being published 
in low impact journals.45 
According to the National Research Investment Plan (NRIP), 
the higher education sector accounted for $6.7 billion (or 24 
per cent) of gross expenditure on research and development 
(GERD) in 200809 and support for the conduct of publicly 
funded research constituted $4b or 45% of government 
research and innovation funding ($8.9b in 2012-13).46 Almost 
50 per cent of higher education R&D expenditure was 
directed to basic research activities.
In 2011-12, research block funding represented $1.8b (see 
Figure 2.1). This had grown from $1.3b in 2003-04. However, 
as noted by Larkins, the RIBG and other research block 
grant funding has progressively decreased between 2000 
and 2008 from 71 cents in every dollar of research income 
(not just the ARC) to 39 cents in 2008.47  The contribution of 
research block funding represents the critical infrastructure 
that supports Australia’s research effort. 
In spite of the introduction of research quality assessment in 
Australia since 2006, the Department has continued to use 
research income and publications returns in conjunction with 
data from the HERDC to determine the allocation of funding 
for a number of schemes including: 
•	 Research Training Scheme (RTS).
•	 Australian Postgraduate Awards (APA).
•	 Sustainable Research Excellence (SRE) program.
•	 Research Infrastructure Block Grants Scheme (RIBG) 
(Category 1 research income only).
•	 Joint Research Engagement (JRE) Scheme. 
•	 Commercialisation Training Scheme.
•	 International Postgraduate Research Scholarships 
Scheme.
The implication is that performance indicators have impacted 
upon the nature of research performance long before the 
development of the ERA or its predecessor the RQF. At each 
occasion that these programs have been assessed or revised, 
tertiary education specialists have raised issues about the 
imposition of performance-based indicators on Australian 
research. Nonetheless, without the ERA it is obvious that 
other kinds of indicators influencing contestable research 
funding will remain, if not expand, as the basis of maximising 
competitive advantage between institutions. 
Figure 2.1: Summary of Australian Government support for Science and Research 2003-13 
Sources. 2012-13 Science, Research and Innovation Budget Tables; MYEFO 2012-13 Expense Measures
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2.2 Development of the RQF 
Discussion about the introduction of research quality 
assessment in Australia dates back to the 1990s. The 
National Board of Employment, Education and Training 
(NBEET) considered the introduction of a research quality 
exercise similar to the UK’s Research Assessment Exercise 
(RAE) in 1996 and decided that is was not desirable, in 
spite of problems with the existing publications measure.48 
Interest in a research quality exercise was also evident in 
the Senate Committee on Education’s 2001 Universities 
in Crisis report, as well as the Department of Education, 
Science and Training’s 2002 Setting Firm Foundations 
issues paper.49 
In May 2004, Coalition Prime Minister John Howard 
announced that the Australian Government would 
establish Quality and Accessibility Frameworks for 
publicly funded research as part of the Backing Australia’s 
Ability programme.50 This followed the publication of 
the Evaluation of Knowledge and Innovation Reforms 
Consultation Report by an External Reference Group led 
by Professor Chris Fell. This report found that research 
block funding should be based on ‘peer review judgments 
made of the overall research excellence of each university’ 
and concluded that ‘there would be value in exploring 
whether it is possible to design an approach to quality 
assessment that avoids the RAE’s drawbacks’.51 The 
Government established an Expert Advisory Group (EAG), 
chaired by the RAE’s Sir Gareth Roberts, to support the 
development of the RQF.
The aim of the RQF initiative was to develop the basis for an 
improved assessment of the quality and impact of publicly 
funded research. It was intended to be: 
•	 Transparent to government and taxpayers so that they are 
better informed about the results of the public investment 
in research.
•	 Ensure that all publicly funded research agencies and 
research providers were encouraged to focus on the 
quality and relevance of their research. 
•	 Avoid a high cost of implementation and a high 
administrative burden on institutions. 
•	 Inform future research funding distribution.
The methodology for the proposed model involved 
universities selectively submitting groups of researchers 
for assessment by external panels, resulting in a system of 
ratings on the basis of the portfolios provided. This would 
then form the basis for the allocation of formula based 
research block funding to the participating institutions.52 
By 2005 the Minister for Education, Brendan Nelson, had 
called for the RQF to redistribute the entirety of the IGS, 
and also 50% of the RTS. Following further discussion in 
the Expert Advisory Group, the final advice was provided in 
March 2006 to the Minister for Education, Julie Bishop, who 
then appointed the RQF Development Advisory Group for 
the implementation of the RQF, with 2008 intended as its 
first assessment round. 
2.3 Development of the ERA
On the election of the Labor Government in late 2007, the 
ERA was introduced to replace the Coalition’s RQF, and at 
its announcement the ERA apparently faced less opposition, 
largely because of differences in the methodology of 
evaluation. Where the RQF sought to identify the quality 
of research at a given institution through a comparative 
assessment of each institution’s four best research groups, 
the ERA was intended to comprehensively analyse quality in 
all areas of each university’s research activity. Also, when the 
ERA was first announced the NTEU was told that the actual 
assessment of disciplines would not occur simultaneously 
and thus would not be comparable, and would be rolled out 
over a number of years. Originally, the ARC acknowledged 
you could not compare apples with oranges.
It was clear from the outset that the ERA represented a 
key policy instrument in achieving the Rudd Government’s 
tertiary education reform agenda, with a role in promoting 
sectoral change. In explaining the government’s intentions 
to replace the RQF, the Minister for Research and Innovation, 
Kim Carr, outlined that the ERA had a role in benchmarking 
Australian research excellence in an international context, but 
also forecast that the ERA would identify areas of potential 
research excellence to inform future resource allocation. 
As part of the Federal Government’s sensitivity around 
these matters, Senator Carr emphasised the importance of 
seeking support from researchers that the system was fair, 
equitable and transparent, and stated that the ERA would 
be decoupled from funding until the system’s standing and 
credibility was assured.53 
On 5 March 2008 it was announced that the ARC would 
administer the ERA. Administrative efficiency, simplicity and 
a balance between metrics and peer review were among 
the reasons offered by Government for making the ARC 
responsible for the ERA.54 By late January 2011, the ERA 
2010 National Report was released, soon followed by the 
publication of a comparable ranking of ERA scores on The 
Australian website.
2.4 Development of the funding 
allocation methods linked 
to the ERA
The preparation for ERA 2012 overlapped with trials and 
consultations conducted by the DIISR, which had primary 
responsibility for the development of the Sustainable 
Research Excellence (SRE) funding allocation method 
attached to the ERA scores. A timeline highlighting key 
dates that combine the development of the ERA and the 
SRE is listed in Figure 2.2.
The SRE program was announced by the Australian 
Government in the 2009-10 Budget Papers as part of the 
Powering Ideas white paper, the Labor Government’s 
response to Terry Cutler’s Innovation Review.55 The SRE 
initiative was aimed at redressing the indirect costs of 
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Figure 2.2: Timeline highlighting key dates since the establishment of the ERA 
New Labor Government ends the Coalition’s RQF 
process Dec 2007
ARC tasked with development and implementation 
of the ERA Mar 2008
ERA Consultation Paper released May 2008
New Indicators Development Group convenes to 
develop ERA methodology
Jul 2008 to 
Mar 2009
Draft Submission Guidelines for PCE and HCA 
clusters released to sector Jan 2009
May 2009 Federal Budget and Powering Ideas introduces new SRE program
ERA 2009 Trial conducted - involving only PCE and 
HCA clusters
Jun to Oct 
2009
Institutional reports for PCE and HCA released. ERA 
2010 Submission guidelines released. Dec 2009
Jan to Apr 
2010 Survey 1 trial on staff hours data conducted
May to Jun 
2010
Consultation Paper exploring principles of SRE 
allocation released and department conducts 
consultations. Universities financial data due.
Institutional submission for ERA 2010 conducted. 
Based on eligible researchers at 31 Mar 2010.
Jun to Aug 
2010 Survey 2 on staff hours data conducted. 
Minister Kim Carr announces ERA 2012 Oct 2010
Nov 2010
Minister Kim Carr modifies Other Grants Guidelines 
legislative instrument to allow for allocation of 
funding through SRE program based upon ERA.
Dec 2010 Universities advised about distribution of SRE funding for 2011.
ERA 2010 National Report released Jan 2011
ARC review of Ranked Journal List and Journal 
Rankings for ERA 2012
Mar to Apr 
2011
ERA Journal rankings end. Minister Kim Carr 
announces changes to ERA 2012. May 2011
May to Jul 
2011
Staff Hours Survey conducted by the Department of 
Innovation, Industry Science and Research for the 
Transparent Costing  (TC) exercise
Consultation on ERA 2012 Submission guidelines 
and Discipline Matrix
Jul to Sep 
2011
ERA 2012 Submission Guidelines and Discipline 
Matrix released Sep 2011
Aug 2011 Consultation Paper on Options for Inclusion of ERA in SRE released
Sep to Nov 
2011
SRE distribution methodology including Excellence 
Index (Ei) finalised
Dec 2011 Universities advised about distribution of SRE funding for 2012
Institutional submission for ERA 20102 conducted. 
Based on eligible researchers at 31 Mar 2011
Mar to Apr 
2012
Jun 2012 SRE Financial Data Collection due
2013
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research, ensuring that tertiary education institutions were 
better placed to meet the cost of research activities not met 
by competitive grants programs. Along with the Research 
Infrastructure Block Grants (RIBG) the SRE was intended to lift 
indirect support to 50c in the dollar of Australian Competitive 
Grant (ACG) funding, and eventually was intended to take 
over the RIBG program by 2015.56 
Soon after the 2009 Budget, the former DIISR began 
development of a funding formula, and consultations into 
the detail of the funding model occurred in late 2009 and 
early 2010, culminating in a Consultation Paper.57 These 
consultations determined that the SRE would determine 
three discrete allocations:
• An SRE Base (20%): Where all universities receive a share 
of 20% of SRE funding based on their share of ACG 
Income (Base).
•	 An SRE Threshold 1 (13%): Where universities that 
participate in TC and ERA receive a share of a further 13% 
based upon their relative share of the first $2.5 million 
ACG income.
• An SRE Threshold 2 (67%): Based on a formula that would 
incorporate the ERA.
In 2011, the 67% of SRE funding (Threshold 2) was allocated 
on the basis of Transparent Costings (TC) and a ‘performance 
moderator’ based on research staff (FTE) divided by weighted 
publications. An options paper was released in August 
2011 to explore the modification of the SRE Threshold 
2 to incorporate allocations based upon the ERA quality 
rankings.58 These consultations developed an Excellence 
Index (Ei) derived from the results of the 2010 ERA exercise. 
In 2012, allocation of the SRE Threshold 2 funding is to be 
determined by a performance index that incorporated the 
Ei score.59 The institution’s Ei score is the sum of each FoR 
code’s contribution to the Ei score and is weighted 7, 3, 1, 0, 
0 for the score of 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 respectively. 
In contrast, funding for student places predominantly 
has been supported through the Commonwealth Grants 
Scheme (CGS), funding for which has risen from $3.5b 
to $4.8b between 2007 and 2010. In relation to research 
training, a proportion is allocated through scholarship 
schemes such as the Australian Postgraduate Award (APA) 
and the International Postgraduate Research Scheme (IPRS). 
A proportion also comes from the Research Training Scheme 
(RTS) whose purpose is to support the indirect costs of 
research training for higher degree research (HDR) students. 
The introduction of performance based funding attached to 
research training highlighted that the necessity of research 
training extended well beyond student finance, with the 
former Minister for Education, Dr David Kemp establishing in 
the white paper that previewed the RTS, that HDR students 
were a major resource in terms of research yield, academic 
rejuvenation and dissemination of knowledge and skills within 
and between the research and wider communities.60 In 2012, 
the RTS performance index was composed of three kinds 
of performance based data: HDR student completions (50%) 
per cent; Research income (40%); and HERDC recognised 
research publications (10%).
The funding dedicated to the SRE program was the major 
part of the discretionary funding denied the tertiary education 
sector in the 2012-13 Mid Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 
(MYEFO) (see Figure 2.3).
In August 2011, the former DIISR also undertook a review of 
the development of quality standards and issues relevant to 
the review of the Research Training Scheme (RTS) through 
the Research Workforce Strategy Advisory Group (RWSAG). 
The review was undertaken in two parts, beginning with a 
review of the quality aspects around research training, and 
intended to follow with a second review focused upon 
technical aspects of the RTS. The draft consultation paper 
for the first review anticipated that the second could include 
options on how outcomes of the ERA would feed into the 
funding formula.61 This second options paper has not yet 
been presented to the sector. 
Also in 2011, the former DIISR published a review of 
Australia’s publicly funded research, calling for greater 
national strategic dialogue and better coordination of 
Australian research effort.62 The review also called for a 
feasibility study to be undertaken about approaches for 
developing a system-wide research impact assessment 
mechanism. Discrete from this, a national trial to measure the 
economic, social and environmental benefits, or ‘impact’ of 
publicly funded research was undertaken at 12 universities, 
including members of the Australian Technology Network of 
Universities (ATN) and the Group of Eight Universities (Go8), 
Charles Darwin, Newcastle and the University of Tasmania. 
This was called the Excellence in Innovation for Australia 
(EIA).63 In July 2012, a discussion paper moving towards 
a National Research Investment Plan (NRIP) followed the 
Department’s review of publicly funded research and the 
Plan was finally published in November 2012.64 
2.5 Why the quality of publicly 
-funded research is evaluated
At its most general, a research evaluation system (RES) 
represents a state instrument deployed through a research 
policy agenda that is focused at improvement in the quality 
of publicly-funded research. It is distinguishable from the 
practice of research evaluation or assessment that focuses 
upon the methodologies that describe individual evaluation 
tools, ranging from peer review to bibliometrics, and from 
case to patent analysis. It is also distinguishable from a newer 
term, performance-based (budgeting and) research funding 
systems (PRFS), which describes not only the evaluation of 
research quality but the distribution of research funding that 
depends on the results of the evaluation.65 
In becoming part of the management and governance of 
publicly funded research around the world, RESs have had a 
diverse array of national histories (see Table 2.1). As asserted 
by the German State Secretary for the Ministry of Education 
in 2005, these first emerged in the 1980s, and shifted to 
the evaluation of institutions in the 1990s.66 System-wide 
research assessment began in the UK in 1986 when the 
University Grants Committee (UGC) prepared and published 
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its first report. In the Netherlands, a committee for chemistry 
was established in 1978 and delivered a report about the 
development, quality, and relevance of Dutch chemistry 
in an international perspective in 1980. The Dutch model 
began in earnest in 1985, with the Ministry of Education and 
Sciences and Dutch tertiary education institutions agreeing 
to develop a national system in which universities would be 
responsible for the internal and external assessment of their 
various education and research roles.
In the international scholarship, the emergence of RESs and 
PBRFs is generally attributed to a range of system-wide 
forces. Firstly, there is the transformation in the public value 
of tertiary education systems which posits the nation-state 
as a driver of prosperity and economic productivity, and 
the growing perception that public investment in science 
and technology is a basis to leverage global competitive 
advantage. Secondly, the interest in evaluation systems 
is underpinned by the convergence between ‘Mode 2’ 
approaches to knowledge production that result in context-
driven, interdisciplinary and problem-oriented research, with 
changes in research funding systems that deliberately focus 
upon transparency and public accountability.67 Thirdly, there is 
government’s expanded emphasis upon competition through 
concepts such as the New Public Management (NPM) that 
has used the inherent competition in research to formalise 
systems of funding contestability, and establish coordination 
frameworks that simultaneously drive at improvements in 
state control as well as transparency.68 As claimed by Hicks, 
the introduction of PBRFs tend ‘to be just one part of larger 
changes and although independent rankings may substitute 
for the research evaluation component, without the larger 
changes universities cannot respond to incentives to increase 
their prestige. This suggests that the focus should not be 
the PRFS per se, but rather increasing contestability and 
institutional autonomy in a university system’.69
Ultimately, the literature highlights that performance-based 
approaches to evaluating and funding research are highly 
diverse and have internationally resulted in a ‘continuum of 
complexity’. Certainly, there is a range of critical ways in which 
one may wish to delineate different kinds of RESs. Gerna 
and Martin described one important distinction between 
ex ante and ex post evaluations, or the difference between 
formative evaluations that are conducted prior to research, 
and summative evaluations that involve making judgments 
about the performance of a unit by comparison to similar 
units.70 Coryn et all distinguished between three types of 
RESs by looking at the performance indicators embedded in 
the funding allocation process:
• Type 1: Large-scale performance/judgment based exercise 
of various types and classes (performance based funding).
• Type II: Bulk funding models (block grants to large groups).
• Type III: Indicator driven-models (e.g. funding based on 
algorithms).71
In contrast, Glaser differentiates between four kinds of RESs 
based upon their consequences for universities.72 Hicks 
narrowed in on PRFSs and details shared characteristics 
amongst all of them including the focus on increased 
productivity, stronger service orientation, enhanced 
accountability and introducing market incentives.73 
Tunzelmann and Mbula described another four basic 
approaches to RES.74
Figure 2.3: Past and projected funding for Research and Research Training provided under Higher 
Education Support Act (HESA) 2003, 2003-16
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The use of performance indicators has become commonplace 
internationally. As argued by Meek and Lee, ‘This is where 
performance indicators become most controversial as the 
emphasis shifts from their use as one of many inputs into 
effective decision-making to using them as a ranking device 
to differentially allocate esteem and funding’.75 Nonetheless, 
in considering the different ways in which RES is understood, 
it is important to acknowledge that the introduction of 
state-sponsored RES is not necessarily associated with the 
allocation of government funding. And where it has been, 
others have warned about the unique national dimensions 
that guide the design of research assessment. For instance, 
Auranen and Nieminen have provided warnings about the 
country-specific differences among university systems in 
relation to steering impulses and competition incentives, 
and that university research is conducted in different country-
specific funding environments.76
Previously, Orr argued that system design must match the 
design purpose. He argued that a penalty system would only 
work if the purpose was to instil competition, ‘a decision 
regarding each element must be related back to the ultimate 
purpose of the procedure and to the context within which the 
procedure will be implemented. A change in purpose would 
necessitate a review of the procedure’s design. Adopting 
an existing procedure for a different context would equally 
require modifications’.77  Comparability is tied to purpose, 
and the design purpose represents a central feature of an 
RES’s integrity and credibility.
Instructive to this, the Berlin Workshop in 2005 called for the 
object of research evaluation to be situated ‘in its proper 
context’. This proper context included the threat of ‘project 
fallacy’ or a disaggregation between the actual assessment 
exercise, as conducted by a public agency, and the impacts 
upon the nature of research, or interaction between the 
measure and the strategies of the ‘research performer’. The 
workshop importantly concluded that, ‘Evaluation needs to 
take the actors and the constellation as the units of analysis’.78 
In May 2012, the League of European Research Universities 
(LERU) likewise called for governments and research funders 
to ‘assess assessment’, ‘evaluating what works in different 
research environments, applying lessons learned rigorously 
but sensibly, and enabling informed decisions on the basis 
of valid and reliable evidence. Indeed, one of our main 
messages in this paper is that research assessment needs to 
be understood correctly and applied sensibly’.79
Underpinning any of the potential approaches and 
methodologies that a country might take to research 
evaluation, it would seem self-evident that an assessment 
about the impact of the RES itself should be fundamental to 
evaluation, importantly providing insight into how the RES 
might be improved over time. This kind of assessment must 
look not only at research productivity in a metric sense, or 
confined to the evaluation instrument itself, but its effects 
upon the culture of research more broadly.
Table 2.1: Selected national performance-based research funding systems for universities
Country System Year implemented/ major revision Agency
United Kingdom RAE moving to REF 1986/current Formerly HEFCE, now Department of Business Innovation and Skills
Spain sexenio 1989 National Commission for Evaluation of Research Activity (CNEAI)
Slovak Republic 1992/2002 Ministry of Education
Hong Kong, China RAE 1993 University Grants Commission
Australia Composite Index; RQF; ERA CI – 1995;  ERA – 2010, 2012 Australian Research Council (ARC)
Poland Parametric evaluation 1991/1998-99 Science Council
Portugal Research Unit Evaluation 1996 Science and Technology Foundation
Italy VTR/VQR VTR – 2006;  VQR – 2003/current
Agency for the Evaluation of 
University System and Research
New Zealand PBRF 2003/current Tertiary Education Commission
Belgium (Flemish 
community) BOF-key 2003/2008 Steunpunt O&O Statistieken (SOOS)
Norway Norwegian model 2006 Ministry for Research and Education
Sweden New model for allocation of resources 2009 Ministry of Education
Denmark Implementation of the Norwegian model Current
Finland Funding formula for allocation of university resources 1998/2010 Ministry of Education
  
Source. Hicks 2012
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3.1 Summary
The next three chapters set out the findings of this Report. 
Chapter 3 particularly relied on the eight focus groups and 
eleven in-depth, semi-structured interviews, the recorded 
sample totalling 50 participants, as well as drawing from the 
national survey of 39 senior research administrators about 
the use of ERA to build questions around the quality of 
communication about the ERA. This was supplemented by 
findings from the ECR workshop.
Amongst participants there was a wide divergence of 
opinions about what the ERA was meant to do, whether 
it was fulfilling those purposes, and the extent to which it 
generated public benefit. In contrast to DIISRTE’s claims that 
there is a ‘broad acceptance of ERA as a rigorous method’ 
by tertiary education stakeholders,80 many participants 
had fundamental concerns with the ERA methodology. In 
any case, it is important to highlight that the ERA was not 
universally considered a poor assessment instrument. 
Many academics and researchers expressed deep concerns 
about whether the ERA process was inclusive of different 
kinds of research output, and the implications for publishing 
in journals not included in the 2012 ERA Journal List (such as 
foreign language journals). Some expressed concerns about 
whether the ERA process was inclusive of non-traditional 
outputs, such as creative outputs, and other esteem 
indicators (such as editing non A* ranked journals). In nearly 
every focus group, an assumption was made was that the 
ERA process had a disproportionate journal emphasis, and 
disadvantaged particular disciplines and kinds of research. 
In part, this can be contextualised by the fact many 
academics and researchers had poor access to information 
about the ERA. However, barriers to information also led 
many researchers to conflate the ERA with practices and 
behaviours at various institutions that have either sought to 
manipulate the ERA outcomes or drawn upon ERA indicators 
in the performance management of staff. This includes the 
formal use of the ERA journal rankings over a year after they 
were abandoned and in spite of some efforts by the ARC 
to ensure they are no longer used. In limited instances the 
ERA and the ARC were blamed for institutional research 
performance practices in fact unrelated to the ERA.
Lack of clarity about the ERA’s purpose has at one level 
suspended some criticism, but on another has reduced 
the confidence of Australian academics and researchers. It 
has enabled a conflation of the integrity of the assessment 
instrument with the perverse consequences it has 
engendered. The lack of quality information amongst 
academics and researchers ranging from early career through 
to senior and executive roles poses a risk to the confidence 
of the sector in ERA.
3.2 Perceptions of the ERA 
methodology
In brief, the Australian ERA exercise is a system of research 
evaluation that fundamentally depends upon peer review. 
The ARC collects comprehensive data from all eligible tertiary 
education institutions, including institutional information and 
data on a range of indicators of research productivity. These 
are described as submissions.81 
The data is evaluated by eight Research Evaluation Committees 
(REC) established at what is understood as the ‘discipline 
cluster level’, and composed of senior, expert researchers 
from around Australia who have been nominated by the ARC. 
The eight disciplinary clusters are defined by the ARC (and 
in the 2012 ERA exercise this has been modified to create a 
discrete discipline cluster for Economics and Commerce):  
•	 Physical, Chemical and Earth Sciences (PCE)
•	 Humanities and Creative Arts (HCA)
•	 Engineering and Environmental Sciences (EE)
•	 Education and Human Society (EHS)
•	 Economics and Commerce (EC)
•	 Mathematical, Information and Computing Sciences (MIC)
•	 Biological and Biotechnological Sciences (BB)
•	 Medical and Health Sciences (MHS) 
The scope of data covered in the decisions made by RECs 
has included:
•	 Explanatory Statements.
•	 Eligible Researcher Data (FTE; level; status; function; FoRs 
up to three four-digit codes). 
•	 Data on Research Outputs (books, chapters in scholarly 
texts, journal articles, conference papers, non-traditional 
output).
•	 Data on Research Income. 
•	 Data on Applied Measures (plant breeder’s rights, patents, 
registered designs, etc). 
•	 Data on Esteem Measures (fellowship of a learned 
academy or AIATSIS, nationally competitive fellowships, 
membership of a statutory committee, etc). 
RECs and ERA Peer Reviewers also directly peer reviewed a 
sample of research output. In the evaluation process, RECs 
rate each Unit of Evaluation with a score between N/A and 5. 
A Unit of Evaluation is effectively the Field of Research (FoR) 
code for all research submitted at an eligible institution. The 
final RECs scores are published in the National Report.
In the 2010 ERA exercise, particular research outputs (i.e. 
journal publications and some conference papers) were 
ranked according to the ‘ERA journal rankings’ along four 
tiers of quality A*, A, B, and C. This ranking system was 
abandoned in May 2011 and replaced with a ‘new journal 
indicator’.82 Available to the RECs is a list of all the journals 
that a single Unit of Evaluation published in, and orders them 
from the journal containing the greatest number of articles 
down to the least.83
3. Reflections on the ERA exercise
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3.2.1  Mistaken assumptions about 
the role of ERA journal 
rankings
The focus groups explored concerns around the ERA 
methodology in some depth. However, a significant number 
of participants addressing the ERA methodology mistakenly 
presumed that ERA journal rankings were still in operation. 
To illustrate the degree of misunderstanding, in Focus 
Group 3 the discussion about the ERA methodology led to 
assumptions that the ERA journal rankings were still being 
implemented. Three participants went on to assert that 
a primary purpose of the ERA was to create a hierarchy of 
research outputs focused around journal publications. The 
ERA methodology thus had a purpose in influencing: (a) the 
mode of output of academics towards journals irrespective of 
discipline, and (b) the direction of output to specific journals 
considered as A* and A.
Participants employed in departments or research centres 
that no longer focused on ERA journal rankings often 
acknowledged a residual practical use of the ERA journal 
rankings as a quality proxy for publication selection and 
performance review purposes. Others acknowledged 
their role in the university environment for a range of non-
evaluation purposes, sometimes informally, but on numerous 
occasions implemented through university policy. Some of 
the more adverse consequences in the use of ERA journal 
rankings will be explored in a later chapter. 
3.2.2 Other assumptions and key 
concerns
Taking into account that some of the concerns expressed by 
participants, including potential misunderstandings about 
how the 2012 ERA process was conducted, key issues across 
all focus groups included that the ERA:
•	 Has too strong an emphasis on journal publications.
•	 Excludes important kinds of research such as non-
traditional outputs and esteem indicators (such as creative 
works and non-English language journal publications).
•	 Contains an inherent bias towards STEM disciplines.
•	 Created misunderstandings around submission 
expectations because of changes in the 2012 
methodology.
•	 Has a questionable methodology because of alleged 
inadequate practices and accountability measures around 
journal ranking assessments or ERA peer reviewers.
•	 Does not moderate ERA scores according to career 
progression of the FoR groupings of staff, thus weighting 
the demonstration of research quality to senior and 
established staff.
Concerns expressed about the ERA methodology are well 
illustrated by two Level B researchers in Focus Group 4 and 5:
FRANCIS:  Some of the stuff we’d be interested in is other 
esteem measures for research, or whether 
you sit on government advisory committees. 
...Basically from (what) I understand, the vast 
majority of what it’s (the ERA) used for, and 
what actually gets reported, is income and 
publications.  ...A lot of outputs, that we see as 
important, might be included or not included 
but they’re not given the same weight.  That’s 
certainly our impression.
ELAINE:  I do want to point out that another area that 
ERA completely overlooked is publications 
in other languages. I publish in both French 
and English and my French publications 
count for nothing - nothing at all. Maybe 
they (the ARC) don’t have any knowledge of 
(what) quality is and which journals I picked to 
publish in. Often collected editions are now 
themes that are run around particular research 
centres in France. Without (the inclusion of 
collected editions there are no incentives) to 
network with someone. ...None of the value 
that you bring to a university in terms of your 
international connections and your language 
actually counts for anything.
Notably there were contrasting perceptions about the 
potential inclusion of impact measures. Some claimed that 
a problem with the ERA was that prestigious academic 
journals tended not to be read or engaged with by more 
general Australian audiences. In contrast, others suggested 
that developing an impact indicator would endanger more 
esoteric fields of research, and have an insidious effect upon 
research management processes, with research managers 
likely to look for potentially misunderstood evidence of the 
quality of academic work:
JASON: Indeed, if ERA was to start talking about impact 
they’d be running around saying, ‘We want 
evidence of you having produced something 
that’s had an effect in your profession or in 
your field’.  
3.2.3 Improvements to the ERA 
There are three issues about the ERA methodology that have 
clear ameliorative implications for a future ERA round. The first 
is that a number of research administrators were concerned 
about the opportunity cost placed upon institutions for 
meeting their obligations to the ERA submission.84 The SRE 
assigns elements of its funding on the basis of compliance 
with ERA and the TC exercise, but does not account for the 
opportunity cost arising from the investment of time and 
resources by universities, senior leadership groups, senior 
administrators, research managers or support staff, and a 
legion of ‘eligible researchers’, preceding or following the 
ERA process. Certainly, without any independent review of 
the ERA process the opportunity cost of the ERA exercise 
in terms of this resource commitment, and of REC members 
and ERA peer assessors, has not been quantified.
The second is the need to ensure more explicit language 
and improved communication between institutions and 
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the ARC to manage misunderstood expectations. This 
occurred in 2012 for a number of institutions in relation to 
the percentage of outputs that would be peer reviewed by 
ARC assessors, with many institutions thinking it was 30% 
of all outputs, rather than 30% of each kind of output.85 The 
implications of this was a very significant time and labour 
impost placed upon staff and administrators at a number of 
institutions in April 2012. 
The third is that the ERA methodology does not account 
for research quality on the basis of career progress, and 
unambiguously contains incentives that disadvantage 
the development of research staff by institutions, and in 
particular ECRs and ECAs. This issue arose in a number of 
contexts during the course of data collection, including in 
non-recorded interviews. 
Professor John Hattie, a New Zealand research evaluation 
expert, and Associate Dean of Research at the University 
of Melbourne, elaborated this point. In comparing the 
ERA and the NZ Performance Based Research Fund (PBRF) 
he expressed major concerns around the implications for 
investing in and growing new researchers: 
Why should ‘I’ (university) invest in this group of young 
academics and hope that they will grow? Why not just 
go out and pick them when they’re grown? That is 
the biggest problem I see with ERA and PBRF. That’s 
why we deliberately changed the rules of PBRF to 
favour the younger (academics), and encourage the 
universities to invest in them. ...So my biggest problem 
with the ERA is –(that) it could stop us investing in our 
own (young academics).
3.3 Perceptions of the purposes 
of the ERA
To properly situate the perceptions of staff, the five key 
objectives of the ERA according to the 2010 ERA National 
Report and the 2012 ERA Submission Guidelines are as 
follows: 
1. Establish an evaluation framework that gives government, 
industry, business and the wider community assurance of 
the excellence of research conducted in Australia‘s higher 
education institutions.
2. Provide a national stocktake of discipline-level areas of 
research strength and areas where there is opportunity for 
development in Australia‘s higher education institutions.
3. Identify excellence across the full spectrum of research 
performance. 
4. Identify emerging research areas and opportunities for 
further development. 
5. Allow for comparisons of Australia‘s research nationally 
and internationally for all discipline areas. 
In the 2010 and 2012 submission guidelines its intended 
use for the distribution of funding is stated but is notably 
inconsistent. In the 2010 ERA Submission Guidelines there is 
a reference to the SRE:
ERA will inform the performance component of the 
Sustainable Research Excellence in Universities Program. 
The eligibility of institutions for funding from the 
Sustainable Research Excellence in Universities Program 
will be contingent on their participation in ERA. The 
Government will determine how the allocation of other 
Research Block Grants may be linked to ERA results in 
consultation with the higher education sector.86 
In 2012 the intended uses were modified to include both the 
SRE and the RTS:
ERA is included as a key measure of performance in 
the 2011–2013 mission based compacts between the 
Australian Government and institutions and has already 
informed the development of the Government‘s 
Research Workforce Strategy (RWS). ERA outcomes 
will also inform: 
•	 The allocation of funding through the Sustainable 
Research Excellence in Universities (SRE) initiative; 
•	 The funding of research training through a modified 
Research Training Scheme (RTS); and 
•	 The new minimum standards for higher education 
research and research training, to be administered 
by the Tertiary Education Quality and Standards 
Agency (TEQSA).87
The most common purpose identified by participants was 
the role of ERA in benchmarking Australian research and 
identifying areas of excellence. As stated by one mid-career 
researcher: 
PETER:  It’s designed to measure or perform or assess 
I suppose, in a metric sense, in a qualitative 
sense, exactly how we perform as a nation 
with regards to specific and particular themed 
research areas, and how we then compare 
to other research produced in other places. 
So where we sit, what our focus is, how that 
focus might shift, (and) how good that focus is 
comparatively. That’s my understanding of the 
government’s use of it.
Unlike Peter, few others identified a role for ERA in identifying 
emerging areas and opportunities for excellent research, 
and it was largely left to senior administrators and higher 
education experts to insist upon the value of the ERA as a 
public policy instrument, potentially demonstrating to the 
Commonwealth the value of allocating resources to publicly 
funded research and universities, against other industries 
and sectors that compete for the same scarce funding. 
On the matter of the ERA’s use in informing a funding 
mechanism, the breadth of knowledge and attitudes were 
even more diverse. For some it was not clear whether 
the ERA was meant to allocate funding (or whether it was 
intended to be used as a performance measurement tool): 
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SIMON:  (The ERA) is supposed to be more aggregated 
at that institutional-national kind of level, 
across the particular research areas, but 
is it being used to compare institutions 
against institutions, and researchers against 
researchers, and make appointments on the 
basis of professional appointments on the 
basis of an individual’s performance within a 
research centre?  I’m not sure whether legally 
that that’s what the ERA charter is, whether 
that’s permissible.  
BARRY:  I think similar thoughts pop into my mind 
as well, as Simon’s just said. Although I also 
think, and I’m actually not really sure about 
this, is how much research funding is actually 
allocated to universities based on (the) ERA? 
I’m not sure about how it sits, how important 
is it really? I had a lectureship in the UK and 
I was part of their - what they call the RAE 
which is sort of a similar kind of an exercise. 
It was always very clear that this was going 
to contribute a huge amount of funding to 
universities so it was always attached with 
such huge importance. So apart from it being 
an audit and a way of trying to quantify our 
research quality, I’m not clear about how it 
actually sits in terms of funding models.
Some participants acknowledged that the comparability 
of ERA scores meant that the ERA was intended as a 
basis to allocate and concentrate scarce funding. Very few 
understood that the ERA was likely to allocate SRE funding. 
Aside from a research manager who sought to explain it 
to his focus group and references in an interview with Ian 
and a research manager, the only consideration of the SRE 
between participants was as follows:
ELAINE:  That was just for the sustainable research at 
SRE funds.  It was for the $5 million basically, 
that’s all, wasn’t it?
FACILITATOR: That was competition over $5 million?
ELAINE: Yeah.  Wasn’t it?
NIGEL: Yeah, but I’m not sure exactly where that 
fund’s come from. I think it’s tied to the ERA, 
the sustainable research funds.  
No participant from the ECR workshop mentioned the SRE. 
Needless to say, there were near negligible references to 
the RTS as a basis of funding allocation. One of the two 
references was in relation to the introduction of the recent 
changes to the meaning of ‘research active’ conducted 
through the Monash Institute of Graduate Research (MIGR).
For many participants, the intended allocation of public 
funding triggered concerns about the kind of resource 
concentration intended by government. Some demonstrated 
immense trepidation about measures encouraging greater 
competition in general. Others portrayed concern about 
the implications of greater competition for Australian 
researchers or research in particular disciplines. Several 
participants, especially senior staff from non-Group of Eight 
(Go8) universities, were particularly concerned about the 
concentration of public funding in the Go8s. 
Some participants suggested that there were strong 
differences between what the ERA was purported to do and 
what it actually did, such as a mid-career researcher from 
Focus Group 2, an ECR from Focus Group 5, and a senior 
researcher from Focus Group 8:
CAROL:  No, I can see the idea, and I kind of agree with 
my colleagues, but unfortunately what (the) 
ERA was intended to do and what it actually 
does on the ground for working academics are 
often two different things.
SCOTT: It’s there obviously to assess research. It hasn’t 
done that all that well and there’s been lots 
of unintended consequences there that are 
pretty harmful, I guess.
BILL:  But I think it’s also an agenda setting system - 
where it’s possible to influence the way research 
goes, by the way things are applied and various 
metrics. As such, I don’t think that’s a terrible 
thing, but what concerns me is how it can 
potentially be used by universities and schools, 
in terms of staff security, and also the impact it’s 
having on teaching, and the trade-off...
In essence, with the participants who expressed an opinion 
around the purpose of the ERA, a significant proportion 
claimed the ERA’s public benefit was vastly different from 
perceptions about its intended purpose. In many cases 
that intended purpose was considered secondary to the 
implications that the ERA presented in relation to the 
professional interests of staff. 
There was almost a negligible distinction between the role of 
the ARC and the Department of Tertiary Education in terms 
of differentiating the responsibilities and policy intentions 
of government. A small number of focus group participants 
could not establish a legitimate public purpose for the ERA. 
In one instance, David from Focus Group 1 highlighted that 
the argument around research evaluation had not been 
made as a matter of staff engagement. Notably, where 
some participants did strongly approve of the ERA exercise, 
reservations about what the public intent of ERA were 
enlarged by what it was used for: 
JOHN:  Now the basic idea of the ERA I don’t oppose, 
alright? I think it’s worthwhile - the idea that 
they’re looking for good quality stuff is useful 
and the government should take that into 
account in funding. I have real problems with 
the way it’s structured, but I don’t have any 
principle objection to it. I see people really 
very easily take these things, and do it in an 
unthinking way, or do it in a way that precludes 
good work, that’s the main danger.  
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Amongst numerous participants a conflation was made 
between the introduction of ERA and government’s perceived 
endorsement of adverse performance management practices 
imposed by institutions. In Focus Group 5 the ambiguity 
about the relationship between government policy and 
university behaviour, a description of an Australian approach 
to university autonomy that Marginson identified back in the 
1990s as ‘steering from a distance’,88 was directly addressed 
and unpacked:
MATTHEW:  Yeah, but is the government actually funding 
your faculty less in these areas - - -
GARY:  I don’t think so, no - - -
JUDY:  The government does not fund facilities. The 
government funds the universities.
MATTHEW:  Right. Is the funding for universities - - -
JUDY:  Any distribution within the university is the 
matter for university management as well as 
faculty management.
GARY:  I guess they’re thinking one day it might.
MATTHEW:  Yeah, one day it might, but if it isn’t now, 
so the management is using the ERA for a 
purpose which has no financial relevance at 
the moment by the sounds of it.
NIGEL:  I think there (is) governmental pressure on the 
universities to use the ERA.
MATTHEW:  Is it financial or is it just words at the moment?
NIGEL:  Well, I don’t know because, I mean, all I can go 
by is rumour.
JUDY:  I think it goes to the question about, what 
information do we get from the universities?
NIGEL:  Yeah, but, the critical usage of the ERA is in 
the distribution of scholarships.  That’s where 
it (is) being used already. I mean, it’s not only 
being used for scholarships. It’s been used 
for distribution of research funding inside the 
university and the faculty offshoots that have 
(been) spawned by the ERA, have been used 
in OSP applications in our faculty. But for the 
higher degree co-location of scholarships the 
university has certainly moved to have more 
scholarships in the area of high ERA scores. 
The rumour is that this is in response to 
governmental pressure.
A number of participants believed that institutional 
performance management processes implemented by 
institutions were tied to the government’s intention to exert 
greater influence or ‘control’ over the university research 
environment: 
KATE:  The government isn’t about funding 
appropriate numbers of universities to provide 
higher education for the whole community. It 
wants to redistribute its funding on the basis 
of some measure of output. It does want to 
redistribute the funds to the institutions that 
have the best outputs, and it is trying to devise 
a system to put everybody in competition with 
each other, rather than saying that every state 
in Australia deserves to have good universities, 
every region, and this is how we’re going to 
fund it.  
JASON:  This is an Australian attempt to emulate what 
the British were doing for the previous 20-25 
years in their research assessment exercise. 
Other countries have done them and others 
have not. It is about greater centralised 
governance of higher education in Australia. 
As people point out (this) is somewhat ironic 
given that most universities come from state 
Acts of Parliament. It is the way that federal 
government is able to control performance. 
How does it do that? The perception around 
this, and I think the nervousness for all of us, is 
the implications of how the data will eventually 
be used (and through) how people are ranked. 
LESLEY:  Why did the government invent this? To 
create league tables. I think right across the 
teaching profession. And I put universities in 
there, although it’s (a) slightly different angle. 
There’s a feeling that somehow we probably 
aren’t performing well enough. So you look at 
the school staff and you say, ‘Well the schools 
are doing badly on these terms. We’d better 
measure ourselves against the rest of the 
world’. Whereas previously what they had was 
a numerical measure of number of outputs 
(for) universities, now they want to rate them 
according to quality. So that’s a new thing 
- where we’re going to measure stuff that 
universities do. 
GAIL:  It’s not the rhetorical intention and it’s not 
how it’s explained, but I think people are quite 
aware (that the ERA) would have a number of 
ramifications, that it would be great on ‘this’ 
level, and it would work like ‘this’ at another 
level. It’s been done in the UK and we’re 
copying it here. They knew what they were 
bringing in and it has created anxiety to the 
extent that I kind of I kind of try to block my 
attention from it. That’s why I felt that I didn’t 
really want to come here today.  I block my 
attention from it as much as possible, except 
when people literally grab me and say you 
have to do this, or report on it.
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3.4 Quality of communication 
on the ERA
The desirability of communicating reliable information about 
the ERA to researchers can be argued to inform sound public 
policy on a number of fronts. Staff engagement would appear 
to be an important basis to ensure probity about the integrity 
of institutional submissions. It would also appear to be a 
necessary basis to properly evaluate whether improvements 
in research quality have eventually occurred. Of particular 
importance, in the lead up to first ERA trials in 2008, the 
Minister for Innovation and Research Kim Carr put forward 
staff engagement as a de facto design purpose, arguing that 
for funding to be allocated based upon the ERA, the ERA 
required the trust and confidence of university researchers;
Crucially, the evaluation exercise will initially be 
decoupled from funding arrangements with the aim of 
ensuring that the system’s credibility and standing are 
assured before ERA is used to drive resource allocation. 
This way, the government intends to achieve the 
trust and confidence of university researchers, and to 
establish a consensus that the system is fair, equitable 
and transparent.89
Lastly, the quality of information about the ERA and related 
funding mechanisms is related to staff knowledge about the 
internal distribution of research funding by institutions, a 
principle that has previous been espoused within the research 
sector, and remains central to the agency of university staff as 
creators of knowledge.90  
With the extent of misperception about the public benefit of 
the ERA in mind, it is clear that the quality of communication 
about the ERA is also a central tenet in building the trust 
and confidence of the sector in the ERA. It is notable then 
that the 2010 and 2012 ERA Submission Guidelines exclude 
any stated obligation for institutions to engage or inform 
university researchers, even though it is they who are 
apportioned to FoR codes in institutional submissions and it 
is their research that is being assessed. 
Furthermore, concerns about the quality of institutional 
communication about the ERA were highlighted during 
the national survey on institutional approaches to the ERA, 
where senior administrators were asked about whether 
the abandonment of the ERA Journal Rankings had been 
communicated to staff since May 2011. From the senior 
administrators who responded directly to survey questions, 
12 stated that the abandonment of the ERA journal rankings 
had been communicated to staff. Some provided details 
about the fora in which they communicated the end of the 
ERA journal rankings. 
In the survey, a handful of institutions did not make public 
statements about the end of the ERA journal rankings. Some 
claimed they did not need to because ERA journal rankings 
had not been incorporated into university-wide policies in 
the first place. ANU stated, ‘So far as I can recall, ANU did 
not use journal rankings in any formal process and therefore 
did not reverse this when rankings were abandoned’. 
ECU asserted, ‘ECU made no formal changes to policy or 
guidelines with respect to the ERA journal rankings used 
in Round 1, and hence have no need for further change in 
response to the abandonment of the rankings’. UNE stated, 
‘Thus no formal communication was issued relating to the 
dropping of journal rankings from ERA 2012. The issue 
would, however, have been communicated by Discipline 
Champions and Research Director during the preparation 
of ERA 2012’. Furthermore, one DVC-R interpreted ‘formal 
communication’ as communication with ‘ERA Cluster leaders, 
all Associate Deans Research, all Deans via Senior Executive 
and in changes reported to Academic Board’.
The responses inferred very different perceived expectations 
in the communication of institutions with staff. This prompted 
the development of a set of questions that sought comment 
from focus group participants about the nature of institutional 
communication on ERA and how information about the ERA 
was acquired by university staff. 
Taking into account that the insight from focus group 
participants may have been constrained by the 
disengagement of some from the process, it appeared the 
most common kind of communication about the ERA from 
institutions would be an email from the Vice Chancellor or 
the Research Office. In some instances, participants were 
aware of university-wide meetings. In fewer instances, 
participants were aware of faculty, school or centre meetings 
providing specific information about ERA. On rare occasions 
this was the subject of discussion at regular faculty meetings. 
The hierarchical nature of communication was inferred from 
participants at smaller campuses or in research centres and 
institutes who displayed poorer access to information than 
those on main campuses or those well integrated into the 
university’s faculty structure. In a few instances, the first 
discussion about research performance based on the ERA 
for some research staff arose during performance review. 
Notably, information about alignment to performance 
measures was predominantly mandated through faculties 
or schools. Harold, for instance, misplacing a discussion 
about the abandonment of the ERA journal rankings for the 
abandonment of the ERA more generally stated:
HAROLD:  (I receive occasional information) from the 
research office, usually a general email, but 
mostly from within the faculty and discipline 
networks. (When it comes to) information 
about the publication scholarship, and the 
PhD applications, needing to be strategically 
aligned, that’s faculty information and that’s 
continuing even though ERA has been 
stopped. It’s still being used.
The ARC’s information about the ERA was most commonly 
accessed through the website. Some described the 
website as more helpful than their own institution’s pages, 
usually published by the central research office. A number 
of participants were quite dismissive about the quality of 
institutional information that circulated about the ERA. 
One focus group criticised the quality of information on the 
university’s research website. In Focus Group 7 the question 
233. REFlECTIoNS oN ThE ERA ExERCISE
was met with an unambiguous answer: 
LEAH: I think the quality is quite poor.
JILL: It’s almost non-existent.
SARAH: I agree. Very random and you know too 
random to be professional. 
It also appeared that quality of communication was hampered 
in certain instances by staff disengagement, as emerged in 
Focus Group 6:
BRIAN: I will tell you I’m disengaged with (the ERA) 
because I couldn’t cope with these changes - 
from one extreme to the other. I said I’m not 
going to engage with this anymore. I’m not 
going to keep on changing my focus from one 
to the other.
JENNIFER: I did know that the journal thing had gone and 
I think I paid attention to that because of the 
sense of relief I felt - truly. I have also been 
very disengaged. It does make me anxious, 
this whole thing. We only get told about ERA 
when we have to do things, to contribute 
towards it, to identify this or that. And we only 
hear about it when we do well. If we didn’t do 
well, we’d probably hear about it too. That’s 
the level of communication. And I don’t want 
any more. I’m quite happy. 
GAIL: Again my sense is that (when) things come 
around, I read them incredibly quickly and 
they instantly go to the bottom of my brain’s 
filing system. 
Focus group participants overwhelmingly claimed that 
the institution’s formal communication channels provided 
deficient, mandated and often punitive-oriented information 
about the ERA:
GAIL: I just know it was never conveyed to me as a 
dialogue within the faculty. It was always, ‘This 
is what has to be done’. It was a mandated 
compliance thing. It was never a dialogue 
around ways to improve, embed, consolidate, 
whatever. To be quite honest, the only thing 
that would allow me to engage with it was that 
we had a very humane face in the form of X, 
who was the middle person, and empowered 
me to dare to touch it. Because I didn’t want 
to pay attention. It had just come down in such 
a sense of mandate. It’s about compliance - 
checking and monitoring and surveying. 
3.5 Explaining perceptions and 
concerns about the ERA
The concerns of participants about the ERA in part were the 
basis for conducting of the NTEU ECR Workshop at which 
the poor quality of communication at the peripheries of 
the academic workforce was strongly confirmed (see Case 
Study 1). ECRs and ECAs involved in the workshop brought 
an almost universal interest and engagement in information 
about the ERA because of a perceived direct relevance to 
future career pathways. 
In contrast to the recommendations made by speakers at 
the workshop that recommended either disengagement 
or active shaping of the government’s research evaluation 
agenda, the demographic background of participants 
and their comments about the ERA process suggest there 
appears to be a performance knowledge hierarchy, where 
technical knowledge about institutional and government 
policy in relation to ERA and other government policies 
conferred implicit or explicit social status because of a 
growing understanding that this had direct implications for 
staff performance . This will be described in greater detail in 
a later chapter.
It emerged in all forms of data collection that the implications 
of the ERA are more profound than its role as an instrument 
focusing university academics and researchers upon the 
importance of research quality, and was responsible for 
institutional adaptation, the escalation in institutional 
attention to research performance, and a range of significant 
adverse consequences attached to these developments. 
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On 17 August 2012, NTEU ran a 2 hour workshop at the 
Graduate School of Education, University of Melbourne, 
focusing on concerns of Early Career Researchers (ECR) and 
Academics (ECA) in relation to ERA and measures of research 
performance. The workshop hosted 35 NTEU members and 
non-members from across Melbourne, although many more 
wanted to come. 
The event was advertised on the basis of relevance to an 
ECR/ECA cohort and the implications of the ERA for career 
pathways. Based upon the replies to the workshop survey, it 
appears that many came with perceptions of career relevance 
in mind. 
The purpose of conducting six small group discussions was 
to collect comparable information about ECR and ECA 
perspectives on key themes. Each small group explored the 
following three themes:
•	 What ECRs believed the ERA is intended to do.
•	 The professional concerns of ECR’s in relation to ERA.
•	 Where ECRs acquired information about ERA. 
The workshop cohort had much lower union density than the 
focus groups, with 60% non-members, and a much larger 
proportion employed on an insecure basis. A major point 
of interest was whether the workshop would reveal greater 
ambivalence amongst the ECR/ECAs to the ERA’s intended 
purpose. 
What is ERA intended to do?
Across the six groups there was some acceptance that 
government had implemented the ERA as basis to 
demonstrate its public investment in the sector. However, 
four of the six small groups highlighted that they were not 
clear on what ERA was intended to do. They were not sure 
about what kinds of research are assessed or produced under 
the ERA. They were concerned about new and shifting goal 
posts between ERA 2010 and 2012. They were there to ask 
about the role of ‘impact’ in the measurement of research 
quality. They claimed that the ERA lacked transparency.
In understanding that ERA was a basis to distribute public 
funding a range of assumptions were made about what the 
ERA was intended to do. Of concern, this included using 
ERA as a basis to:
•	 Measure staff performance.
•	 Shut down some universities.
•	 Control research output and researchers. One group 
described ERA as a ‘Big Brother on researchers’.
It was also assumed and understood by each of the small 
groups that universities had used ERA for a range of internal 
purposes including:
•	 To develop the quality of research at that institution.
•	 To invest funding in particular research areas, including 
taking funding away from certain disciplines.
•	 As a marketing process to improve the institution’s 
international profile.
•	 As a marketing process to attract high quality researchers.
•	 As a management or compliance tool imposed upon staff. 
ECR Professional Concerns
While there were differences between groups about the 
types of career concerns, all groups saw ERA as critical to 
career development. It was understood that the ERA exercise 
would directly impact upon their publishing behaviour, and 
that because they wanted to fulfil publishing expectations, 
they were trying to understand how journals were ranked. 
Most concluded that they were at the workshop to become 
more empowered about future career choices, to enable 
them to better negotiate the expectations place upon them 
by supervisors, research managers and through performance 
reviews. 
There were a number of important concerns about journal 
publications and the ERA journal list. From a straw poll at the 
end of the workshop, 21 of the remaining 28 participants had 
been recently asked or told to publish in A* or A ERA ranked 
journals. Many did not distinguish between the ERA or the 
ERA journal rankings.
Group Two stated they hoped that ERA could guide them to 
do good research through appropriate rewards. The groups 
were also unambiguous that career development and advice 
around research performance was not great. One group 
called for the introduction of academic mentors to guide 
publication and performance, guided by the perception that 
under previous collegial modes of institutional governance 
career mentorship had been a stronger motif.
Concerns were expressed that the continued use of ERA 
journal lists were:
•	 Limiting diversity of journals academics can publish in, for 
instance, because it didn’t recognise foreign language 
publications.
•	 There were differentiated implications for different 
disciplines depending on number of A* journals. Anything 
other than journal publications is not sufficiently captured 
by ERA. 
•	 Conference journals were not valued at all. 
•	 ERA undervalued the creative work of universities, e.g. 
arts/music practice.
•	 ERA excluded disciplines and research centres where 
outputs were largely outside ERA.
Perceived quality of Information on ERA
It was widely understood that the quality of information 
shared with ECRs about ERA was poor. The most frequent 
and reliable sources of information were colleagues, 
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academic supervisors, Heads of School and Associate 
Deans of Research. Individuals spoke highly of external 
websites such as John Lamp’s ISI webpage,91 the Research 
Whisperer,92 and the NTEU. The ARC website was frequently 
nominated as a source of information but some groups 
expressed reservations with its usefulness and usability. The 
professional association HERDSA was mentioned. University-
based special projects were also mentioned as being useful 
including:
•	 University research forums and symposiums
•	 Mentor groups, coaching sessions, ECR workshops.
It emerged that information about ERA circulated within 
Faculties had varying levels of reliability. Sometimes 
information was only circulated for the purpose of focusing 
ECRs upon research publications. In some instances it 
involved only emails from the Vice Chancellors, the Dean of 
the Faculty or the Head of School. In other instances there 
were staff meetings at which ERA performance measures 
were explored. In one group it was mentioned that the 
first time they had engaged with ERA was in performance 
review. Nevertheless, the overarching perception was 
that information about ERA predominantly came through 
informal channels and there was a lack of concise and reliable 
information about ERA available.
The workshop accentuated and reinforced most of the 
professional issues raised in the focus groups. These included 
that:
•	 The knowledge base of ECRs around ERA was much 
poorer than more securely employed and more senior 
academic staff.
•	 The perception of the ERA amongst ECRs was more 
positive compared to the focus group participants 
but perceptions of its purpose were more divisive and 
extreme.
•	 Misinformation in universities about ERA was rife. 
•	 The most reliable sources of information tended to be 
academic colleagues, supervisors, Heads of Schools and 
Associate Deans of Research. 
More information about the workshop is available at: 
http://www.nteu.org.au/vic/article/NTEU-Early-Career-
Researcher-Workshop-roundup-13227
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4.1 Summary
In order to augment their performance under the ERA process, 
senior leadership groups at eligible institutions applied a 
range of preparatory strategies over the course of the 2010 
and 2012 ERA processes. Typically these would include the 
delegation of communication or coordinating roles to senior 
staff such as Deputy Vice Chancellors of Research (DVC-R). In 
many instances it involved the establishment or secondment 
of dedicated staff in faculties and schools or central research 
offices. In many instances it involved the establishment of 
cross-faculty networks or coordinating groups, sometimes 
spread across senior leadership, other academic leaders such 
as Associate Deans of Research (ADR), and faculty or school 
research managers or research administrators.  
Staff knowledge about the practices deployed at their 
employing institution in relation to the ERA exercise 
ranged significantly, and in certain circumstances was 
limited. It became clear that in certain situations the limits 
on staff knowledge were caused because the activities and 
strategies of certain leadership groups would likely damage 
the integrity of the institution’s submission. Nonetheless, 
the engagement of participants through data collection 
demonstrated that manipulation of the ERA process occurred 
in at least three key ways:
•	 ‘Appointing research stars’ – efforts by universities to lift 
the overall institution or a school’s ERA submission by 
employing highly productive ‘research stars’, sometimes 
on a part-time or adjunct basis.
•	 ‘Disappearing research’ – where a research manager 
or senior administrator would ensure certain research 
outputs would not be evaluated, by apportioning them 
to FoR codes that did not met the low volume threshold, 
and without input from the relevant eligible researchers. 
Sometimes, this would occur through ‘directed 
manipulation’ with senior administrators directing or 
advising managers to not enter research, or researchers 
not to submit output.
•	 ‘Horse-trading’ research outputs which involved 
discussions between university administrators and 
decision makers to ‘hive-off’ research, i.e. discussing 
how certain research outputs would be assigned or 
apportioned multidisciplinary FoR codes to maximise ERA 
scores in particular institution-preferred FoR codes.
Most often these practices were justified as ways to ‘protect 
the research’ of the university, or to protect the research of 
faculties and schools that perceived themselves as being 
placed in competition with one another over scarce funding 
allocated by the institution, whether the link between 
resource allocation and the ERA was explicit or not. 
Institutional manipulation of the ERA process and exploitation 
of the ERA more broadly pose a risk to the integrity of 
the ERA outcomes and the reputation of the ERA, and by 
extension the relevant funding mechanisms. On any premise 
that the ERA operates as a robust evaluation instrument, a 
key step in lifting confidence in the ERA process would be to 
limit its manipulation and misuse.
4.2 Manipulating the ARC 
assessment process
The focus groups and interviews demonstrate that adaptation 
to the ARC’s ERA assessment process was not limited to the 
universities themselves. Numerous responses acknowledged 
the adoption of ERA journal rankings by individual academics 
as a way of demonstrating publication quality, the adaptation 
by Research Evaluation Committee (REC) members and ARC 
peer reviewers in determining ERA journal rankings or Unit 
of Evaluation scores, and interestingly, the political debates 
within professional and representative associations in their 
engagement about the ERA journal list, journal rankings, and 
approaches to the ERA process.
The NTEU’s concerns are that many practices occurring 
in universities during 2010 and 2012 are largely irregular 
and also poorly documented modifications of the 
‘comprehensiveness’ of ERA submissions. As stated in the 
ERA 2012 Submission Guidelines:
Institutions are required to submit comprehensive 
information on eligible researchers and research 
items produced in all disciplines within the specified 
reference periods in the four-digit FoR codes within 
each of the eight ERA discipline clusters. Institutions 
must not be selective about the eligible researchers or 
research items that are submitted. Institutions may only 
be selective about research outputs they choose to 
identify for ERA peer review for those disciplines which 
are subject to ERA peer review.93
In terms of the capacity to exclude certain kinds of output, 
the only exceptions would appear to be where an output 
fails the definition of research, which is ‘the creation of new 
knowledge and/or the use of existing knowledge in a new and 
creative way so as to generate new concepts, methodologies 
and understandings’, or where the aggregation of outputs 
do not reach the ‘low volume threshold’.94 
For the purposes of accountability, the guidelines go on to 
state that the inclusion of false and misleading information 
will potentially attract criminal sanction:
If it appears that any institution or person has 
knowingly provided false or misleading information, or 
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knowingly omitted any matter or thing without which 
the information is misleading, or it appears that any 
other criminal offence may have been committed, 
the ARC may investigate the matter with a view to 
prosecution under Commonwealth criminal law. The 
Commonwealth is committed to protecting its revenue, 
expenditure and property from any attempt, by 
members of the public, contractors, sub-contractors, 
agents, intermediaries or its own employees, to gain 
financial or other benefits by deceit.95
It is notable that responsibility for the integrity of each 
submission is imposed upon institutions and, in particular, 
the Vice Chancellor as the signatory to the ‘Certification 
Statement’ (2012: 70). As already stated, there is no formal 
expectation that staff engagement will occur in relation to 
submission of research output, apportionment or assignment 
of FoR codes. This may provide some protection for staff 
against allegations of criminal conduct but this would also 
mean that the capacity to ensure probity about an institution’s 
submission is significantly diminished. 
In the course of data collection, participants provided 
eyewitness accounts about practices and behaviours in which 
the apportionment of FoR codes to research and researchers 
were modified for the purpose of improving the institution’s 
submission, rather than for improving the accuracy of the 
multidisciplinary coverage of institutional submissions.  
4.2.1 Appointing research stars
In the lead up to the 2012 ERA exercise media stories 
circulated about the involvement of institutions in a range 
of ‘game-playing’ practices, including poaching ‘research 
stars’ to boost the impression of the institution’s research 
performance.96 This included the appointment of research 
leaders in part-time or adjunct positions. Elements of the 
ARC’s changes to the eligibility of researchers in the 2012 
ERA methodology were intended to reduce this kind of 
behaviour, namely the requirement that staff on less than 
0.4FTE demonstrate their ties to the institution.97
Focus group participants confirmed that this practice of star 
appointments had occurred. With the ERA eligibility cut off 
date at 31 March 2011 it appeared that the poaching or 
appointment of ‘research stars’ was increasingly focused in 
terms of an institution’s strategic opportunity to lift research 
performance through purchasing rather than developing 
research excellence. Such a practice leaves open questions 
about the institution’s commitment to internally developing 
research excellence.
It was also argued that this practice had adverse implications 
for the culture of research at various institutions, with 
segmentation between staff on the basis of research duties 
and with existing teaching staff being provided less and less 
opportunity to pursue research: 
CRAIG:  So the school has engaged in recruiting 
people that are stars - who will bring in the 
journals. Some of these people are not being 
incorporated within the School. They basically 
look after themselves. They have very nice 
salaries, because they are stars.  But I don’t 
see that we are building capability or that we 
are getting better.  We only look like we are 
getting better, by recruiting the Maradona 
and the Messi’s, and whatever, which may help 
only if they are team people, and sometimes 
they are, sometimes they’re not. I think the 
concept of it is that we are having a split, 
and the people that are publishing in Bs and 
Cs, they are not getting up, and they are not 
getting extra (allocations), so that they can 
improve their quality.
LANCE:  There is a current group of people who are 
untouchable and cannot be called upon 
because they ‘are’ research, and they will 
not be brought down to the teaching level 
or have their time wasted in the classroom. 
And then there is the teaching crew, who 
are still expected to publish but we have no 
expectation (that) we’re actually going to get 
into these journals. We’ve been told we won’t 
be rewarded for our teaching performances, 
and that if we don’t have high (quality) research 
we’re going nowhere, but we won’t be freed 
up to do research that was getting published 
previously. 
4.2.2 Disappearing research
According to the 2012 ERA Submission Guidelines, ‘To ensure 
that there is a meaningful level of data to be evaluated, a 
low volume threshold exists for each Unit of Evaluation in 
ERA’. This threshold was amended in 2012 from 30 to 50 
apportioned indexed journal articles, and meant that if there 
were less than 50 journal articles in any UoE, it would not be 
evaluated. 
This rule has provided an important opportunity for 
universities to introduce practices that ‘disappear research’, 
by strategically apportioning FoR codes to research outputs 
so that weaker areas fall under the low volume threshold, 
and in some instances perhaps by not submitting particular 
outputs altogether.98 It also meant an opportunity to try 
and showcase research by ensuring strong research was 
collected together above the low volume threshold.99 Some 
participants described the manipulation of FoR coding as 
‘hiving off’: 
MATTHEW:  That was made (by) central management. They 
would simply assign a paper to any discipline 
that they felt they could assign (it to) - subject 
to the rules. In electronic engineering, which 
has been downsized, their publications are 
being - their good publications are being 
assigned to computer science. So, I mean, this 
re-badging is blatant.
At one institution ‘disappearing research’ without 
engagement with the relevant researchers was elaborated 
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by one senior administrator as a way to strengthen the 
university’s submission, especially where units of evaluation 
did not align with departments or faculties within the 
university itself:
FACILITATOR: Well, I certainly wonder about some of the 
metrics that I have seen, which requires that 
staff (do) not publish in B and C journals or …
TRAVIS: That (achieves) absolutely nothing. So we’ve 
done that. We’ve disappeared (research). We 
disappeared the two-digit code X. We were 
close to having 50 publications in that area. 
We don’t have a faculty at the moment there, 
so we don’t put in a submission at X.
FACILITATOR: So the gaming occurs, anyway. So if we’re 
going to be putting forward (research) and 
removing …
TRAVIS: It would be much better to say, ‘Why should 
we stop our researchers from doing research in 
that field if they want to?’ It’s just because we 
don’t want to put forward a (submission for) X.
It is apparent that there is in fact a fine line between an 
administrator providing counsel to ensure researchers 
maximise the university’s ERA score and researchers being 
improperly directed to assign inaccurate FoR codes. One 
Level B researcher would have preferred access to her record 
of research output to ensure that her school was benefiting 
from her publication record. In comparison, Bill described 
some of the advice from the research office as modifying 
the literal truth, to ensure the interests of researchers and 
institutions alike were met:
BILL: We’ve had pep talks about strategies and 
how to maximise our performance. We get 
told to look incredibly closely at the FoRs 
and SEOs, what we should actually put down, 
and whether we should think about perhaps 
stretching, not the truth - stretching credibility 
a little bit - and putting papers down under a 
particular code where perhaps they might be 
better elsewhere, because certain codes have 
more importance, and because we can put 
more people together within those codes. 
4.2.3 Horse-trading research 
outputs
Another set of concerns that emerged during the course 
of data collection was the role of senior administrators in 
meeting together to alter the assignment or apportionment 
of FoR codes in order to maximise the research score of 
various Units of Evaluation (UoE). Based upon comments in 
the focus groups and interviews, these practices appear to 
have been conducted across various levels of seniority for at 
least three of the five institutions. 
One senior administrator reported about this, attributing 
responsibility for ‘horse-trading’ meetings at one institution 
to the DVC-R:  
HARVEY: Well, there were book chapters. Some of 
them they could shift because of that multiple 
coding… but it was an astonishing meeting 
to attend. There were commitments given to 
people from some areas - ‘If you give us those 
publications, for this particular 4 digit code, 
we run you down, we’ll make sure that you’re 
okay after ERA’. Now I’m sure that those areas 
are regretting that decision to go along with it, 
because they’re not okay after ERA.
FACILITATOR: Can I ask - was it Associate Deans from 
different departments that were at that 
original meeting?
HARVEY: It was Associate Deans Research and there 
were FoR code leaders at the meeting as well. 
FACILITATOR: Were there also people from the central 
Research Office?
HARVEY: Yes.
FACILITATOR: Was it called by the Research Office?
HARVEY: It would have been called by the Deputy Vice 
Chancellor of Research.
FACILITATOR: So the research office has quite an 
interventionist role in the way that ERA 
journal rankings and ERA journal publications 
were used for the 2010...?
HARVEY: The Deputy Vice Chancellor Research did. Yes. 
He has executive responsibility for that and I 
know that at one point he was weighing up for 
ERA 2012 whether to ‘raid’ areas that scored 
a 3. In ERA 2010 the publications to bolster 
were some of the areas that scored a 4.
FACILITATOR: Can you explain that in a little bit greater 
detail?
HARVEY: He proposed that this time you needed 50 
publications to get a ranking in humanities 
and social sciences, which you didn’t need 
last time, where you only needed 30. Our area 
had more than 150. So he was weighing up 
whether to instruct us to get it under 50 and 
move the publications to other areas.
A research manager at another institution discussed a similar 
practice in the lead up to 2012, but at a more decentralised 
level revolving around the faculty’s assignment of FoR codes, 
and in contrast with some opportunities for researchers to 
view their record:
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SAM: Usually what would happen is, say if I 
nominated one social science code and 
another social science code, at the faculty 
level they would go, ‘Is this (publication) 
more this discipline or the other? How does it 
read? Does it sit better with your side? Does 
your area need any more?’ So there was this 
whole laying-off of bets. If the other code had 
enough (publications) it would relinquish it and 
it would become ours. It was that kind of game 
playing. It was about packing up, shoring up, 
certain areas. Certain schools exclusively have 
their own FoR code. So we had our people 
in that code, because our code and that 
code go hand-in-hand, but so does another 
code with that code. It was a matter of, ‘Let’s 
divvy this up’. (If a researcher) had a strong 
portfolio in our code and another code, they 
had to make a decision about where to put 
their portfolio. Would it be split? Or should 
we split this other code completely apart, 
pull it apart completely, and put everything 
in another code? These were decisions made 
at the faculty level. The university is only 
concerned with the numbers, the big picture 
stuff. If there was a problem, yes, there would 
be a discussion at the university level about 
how this worked. But normally, it was just the 
faculties talking to each other for coding.  
At another institution, this was largely a consideration for 
networks of academic leaders, particularly those in similar 
disciplines, or disciplines with a potentially broad disciplinary 
base: 
STUART:  Yeah, so essentially we had common 
publications in obvious areas like with A, 
with B, with C, but also with perhaps things 
you’d least suspect, like X, Y, and - almost 
everywhere in science. So it always becomes 
a question of, ‘Well is this proportion correct?’ 
Then there’s a group of publications that no 
one wants. So what do you do with them? ‘You 
have them’, ‘No, we’ll have them’. 
Harvey, who outlined the DVC-R’s role in organising horse-
trading meetings at one institution, also explained why 
there are clear incentives for institutions to ensure that 
researchers have minimal engagement in the apportionment 
of multidisciplinary codes to outputs:
FACILITATOR: Did the research office need to do things 
differently in terms of the way that it 
communicated or organised communication 
involving Associate Deans of Research or 
people who were otherwise on the REC 
committees? …
HARVEY: [pause 3 secs] I don’t know that research 
services should necessarily be responsible 
for this. They could have offered a little bit 
more feedback to people. But so much of the 
ERA result is in how it might be manipulated. 
There’s strategy involved. It’s probably not 
good to tell people that we might have shifted 
their publications for strategic reasons, that we 
might have coded their research in particular 
ways for strategic reasons. If you offer that kind 
of advice, there’ll be all kinds of argument. It 
will take you five times as long to prepare the 
submission.
FACILITATOR: So do you think there’s a problem then in 
the fact that it can be gamed or manipulated 
to improve scores in particular areas? Or is 
that just the way that it’s designed and it’s 
inevitable?
HARVEY: Look, it’s the way ERA’s designed and I’d 
prefer there was no ERA exercise because I 
think it’s encouraged the worse possible kinds 
of conduct on the part of universities. And the 
game playing of Go8s was just appalling. The 
way that universities buy in staff is disgraceful. 
These kinds of practices, especially where researchers play no 
role in the assignment of codes unambiguously undermines 
the comprehensiveness and integrity of institutional 
submissions. The ARC has highlighted that all research must 
be submitted for assessment, and in the course of the ERA 
2012 exercise the ARC did do an analysis on what could be 
considered ‘inappropriate discipline coding’.100 The kind 
of manipulation of FoR coding attached to researchers or 
outputs largely reflect an intention to mislead the ARC and 
horse-trading meetings represent a form of collusion. The 
extent of feedback and concern around these practices 
indicate that there are major integrity issues for the ARC or 
the Federal Government to pursue across the sector.
4.3 Staff perceptions about 
manipulation of the ARC 
assessment process
The responses of focus groups and interview participants to 
their institution’s manipulation of the ERA submissions were 
diverse, but what generally tied these responses together 
was the perception that ‘game-playing’ in the submission 
of ERA data generated a different set of attitudes to the 
concepts underpinning the rationale of research quality 
assessment, diminishing the accuracy of measurement and 
comparability of quality, and narrowing the ERA’s purpose.
Amongst more senior members of the academic community, 
rumours about the manipulation of the ERA process were 
commonplace. Certainly a number of senior administrators 
saw the strategic preparation of the institution’s ERA 
submission as a necessary evil. Preparation and manipulation 
of the ERA submission was considered necessary in order 
to protect the institution’s capacity to undertake research. 
For some members of one institution, it is notable that the 
preparation of their institution’s ERA submission was seen 
not only in relation to improving the institution’s overall 
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score, but in anticipating the internal use of ERA scores by 
the institution, and competition for scarce funding between 
faculties, schools and disciplines. 
One tertiary education expert, Stuart, claimed that though 
the ERA was established to be a funding mechanism. He 
queried the role of ERA as an efficient mechanism:
STUART:  They are funding mechanisms. No matter 
what we want to call them. That’s what they 
are. They are not quality measures. They are 
funding mechanisms. My question is, ‘Is there 
a better way to distribute funding?’ 
Ian, a senior academic at an institution that had not sought 
to distribute SRE funding on the basis of the ERA scores, 
expressed strong reservations about the implications of tying 
the ERA to the SRE and RTS, in light of the extent of ‘game-
playing’, even though he perceived the ERA as a useful 
instrument for academic and research administrators;
IAN: (I have) major concerns.  One thing is (that 
research) becomes centrally managed activity, 
and I think it really has to be at the university 
level that you determine funding. I know with 
the ERA there is a huge amount of game 
playing and we all played the games. If there 
was a relatively weak discipline, ‘How can we 
hide that discipline elsewhere or not count 
it?’ And when the ERA results came out every 
university claimed that they were at the top. 
That’s all fine when it’s just game playing, but if 
it really determines funding, I think it will be a 
disaster. With RTS and SREs. It then becomes 
like the five-year plan for China. Someone in 
Canberra will say, ‘Well, this is our five-year 
plan. You basically (need to) make it more 
attractive’. I think you have to be beyond that.
Other senior academics came to the view that their 
institution’s ERA submission and the ERA process overall was 
an explicitly political exercise. This is well captured in the 
comments by Jason:
JASON:  I see the purpose of the ERA in its first form 
(was) about assessing the quality of research 
performance of groups. It does therefore 
create problems for individuals who don’t 
neatly fit into the groups that the universities 
decide to submit, because it doesn’t assess 
all groups. It assesses the groups that the 
universities put up. So there’s an interesting 
sort of political and judgemental process that 
goes into forming the groups that are going 
to be nominated around the fields of research 
codes, the discipline codes. 
In addition, where some of the aforementioned ‘game-
playing’ practices were openly discussed, it was clear that 
this had highly negative implications for confidence in the 
ERA and even the ARC. A range of unintended and adverse 
consequences of institutional adaptation for the professional 
interests of university researchers and the nature of research 
were commonly cited. At the conclusion of one focus group, 
discussion about the practice of ‘disappearing research’ 
initiated a wider condemnation of the ARC rather than the 
institution’s behaviour:
SCOTT:  But one thing they really should remedy is 
that any piece of research in itself shouldn’t 
be a negative. I think that if you’re producing 
research, it shouldn’t be something that’s got 
to be hidden like a dead body.
[Group laughter]
DIANE: I agree with that.
SCOTT: Some sort of house of horrors. There’s various 
C publications (all) published under the green 
lawn. This is so embarrassing for the ARC. 
Surely they can be shamed into remedying 
things. (This) effectively makes certain areas 
of research or publication a crime against the 
university. 
Just as important were staff perceptions about the internal 
responses of institutions to the introduction of the ERA and, 
in particular, how poorly considered some management 
responses to improving ERA or research performance in 
general were. For some participants there was a perception 
that the university’s responses were clumsy and not assisting 
researchers with the external expectations imposed by 
government: 
TAYLOR: It’s not really a problem about having some sort 
of regulatory body doing these things. It feels 
like in this university, and particularly over the 
last few years, that the university is using the 
regulatory body to regulate even more tightly. 
So rather than helping us meet those external 
expectations, which the different disciplines 
may more or less meet, they’re tightening it 
so that the window is narrower and narrower 
in terms of what we do...
More so than concerns about the ERA exercise itself, it 
is clear that there were overwhelming and very strongly 
held views in relation to staff confidence in the capacity of 
universities to responsibly manage research performance. 
The focus groups and interviews identified that intrusive and 
damaging ramifications that can be linked to the ERA are 
already evident in the sector. The final chapter will highlight 
some of the more adverse kinds of institutional practices that 
are currently unfolding, including dimensions of institutional 
change that transcend the ERA instrument. 
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5.1 Summary
In the focus groups and interviews, perspectives were 
sought about the significance of the ERA in relation to 
the way universities have changed research performance 
expectations. It was perceived by many, including senior 
administrators and research managers themselves, that 
the ERA at an institutional level was often misunderstood 
and misapplied for the purposes of intensifying research 
performance. This misuse was sometimes characterised 
by an explicit intention by senior administrators, and in 
other instances diverged between schools and faculties at 
the same institution, sometimes on the basis of particular 
discipline groups or according to unit managers.101  In a 
number of instances, university-wide policies that defined 
the performance benchmarks necessary to be considered 
‘research active’ were introduced to modify expectations of 
research performance. At some institutions restructuring has 
been introduced on the basis of crude indicators of research 
performance such as ERA scores. The shifts in institutional 
approaches to research performance included the selective 
conversion of staff, not only into teaching-only but HEW 
positions. 
The development of research quality evaluation in Australia 
has been instrumental in generating new risks to the depth 
and breadth of publicly funded research. Previously the 
perceived risks to freedom of intellectual inquiry and the 
autonomy of scholars were narrowly conceived, and revolved 
around the idea that RESs reinforce the conservative influence 
of traditional discipline leaders.102 Such assumptions need to 
be revised in light of the adaptive behaviours of institutions 
portrayed in this study. Certain constraints placed upon 
scholarly autonomy are in some ways inherent to the very 
concept of research quality assessment, particularly because 
it seeks to produce scores that operate as proxies for expert 
judgment. 
The kinds of adaptations that have been observed, however, 
cannot be properly understood without understanding the 
corporatisation of research in Australian universities, which 
has depended upon the central construction of ‘performance 
information systems at institutions’, the purpose of which 
has been to render research activities as ‘measurable and 
commodifiable’.103 That is, in understanding the rationale 
for university managements, research management is a 
prominent but non-exclusive priority constituted by a matrix 
of accountabilities. 
This is enhanced by the character of local funding systems 
in which central planning groups determine and establish 
the formula for block funding distribution.104 Constraints 
on the autonomy of staff do not only originate from the 
assessment instrument but from the implicit and overt 
expectations placed upon staff by institutions in the attempt 
to concentrate and build research strength in light of the 
way quality is measured. Underpinning the ERA’s misuse 
are other kinds of institutional transformations, such as the 
diminution of collegiate decision-making structures that 
mean many institutions are often poorly equipped to analyse 
the implications of ERA assessment or their own research 
performance processes. 
The focus groups revealed that two important ERA indicators 
were most commonly misused:
•	 ERA Journal Rankings – The abandoned ERA journal 
rankings continue to be widely used through both formal 
and informal means, in spite of the ARC’s attempts to 
discourage their use.
•	 FoR codes – At certain universities, the conflation of 
certain FoR codes and academic disciplines has led to the 
assumption that ERA scores evidence the performance 
of academic units, has heightened internal competition 
between disciplines, and led to the reallocation of 
resources. 
The growing frequency of these circumstances has important 
implications for the professional and industrial interests of 
staff. They also have policy implications where such practices 
and behaviours entrench career barriers; diminish the culture 
of research; destroy or diminish the breadth of research; 
or diminish the attractiveness of the academic career. The 
introduction of a quality evaluation assessment has not 
diminished managerial dependence upon more established 
performance indicators such as research income and HDR 
completions, but created a value-oriented and sometimes 
more subjective layer through which the research performance 
expectations placed upon staff can be expressed.  
5.2 The escalation of 
institutional competition on 
research performance
Aside from the manipulation of the ERA process itself, the 
ERA has accelerated institutional concerns about research 
performance and provided an important set of measures 
to mobilise adaptive behaviours and practices. In 2012, 
the introduction of the student demand-driven model, in 
particular, not only lifted the climate of competition around 
student demand, but the climate of competition between 
universities over their share of other sources of public 
funding.105
5. Competition around research 
performance and adverse consequences 
for Australian researchers 
32 Impact of ERa REsEaRch assEssmEnt on UnIvERsIty BEhavIoUR and thEIR staff
The expanding institutional concern with research 
performance is evident, for instance, in the recent 2012 
Higher Education Industry Survey,106 in which over 730 senior 
level decision-makers in tertiary education took part. The 
summary report found that for those who work within the 
research:
•	 Rankings and performance measurement was their key 
priority.
•	 Securing government funding is their biggest challenge.
•	 International collaboration is the largest area for 
opportunities.
•	 Concentration of research excellence is the biggest 
challenge in building a research workforce.
The implications for university staff through the adaptation of 
institutions linked to the ERA became evident in significant 
structural changes that occurred in Australian universities in 
2011 and 2012. A prominent example was the University 
of Sydney. In late November 2011, the university sought to 
reduce academic staffing costs by 7.5% and make as many 
as 340 staff redundant based on an assessment of their ERA 
research output. The university’s own Draft Change Proposal 
tied this to the university’s ERA performance, stating;
The proposed process for managing the reduction 
in academic staff will be based on relative research 
performance, assessed on a University-wide basis. The 
assessment of relative academic research performance 
will be based on research outputs as defined in the 
Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA) guidelines, 
or equivalent research output as assessed by Faculty 
and Central Assessment Panels.107
By mid-2012, a strong campaign by the University of 
Sydney NTEU Branch reduced management’s target to 23 
redundancies.  Another example was the Australian National 
University (ANU). In March 2012, the ANU announced 
between 100 and 140 staff cuts in order to make the 
university ‘financially viable and internationally competitive’. 
The ANU’s statement around the financial strategy proposed 
that staffing reductions would be conducted in a strategic 
manner, using academic performance (including ERA, student 
demand and evaluation) as the criterion in determining staff 
reductions.108 The ANU NTEU Branch’s strong campaigning 
reduced redundancies in the School of Music from 34 to 21 
staff.109 
A Monash University physicist, Susan Feteris, has subsequently 
argued that the introduction of the ERA has led to a halt in the 
rise of women researchers in Go8 institutions starting from 
2010 and continuing through 2012, claiming that women 
were predominantly affected where ‘redundancy rounds used 
ERA-based criteria’ and staff ‘feared they may be selected 
took voluntary packages’. 110
Parallel to cases where the ERA performance of institutions 
has been referred to in relation to the proposed re-profiling 
of the academic workforce, there have been other recent 
instances where universities have introduced or intensified 
managerialist practices through the introduction of research 
performance metrics or staff performance benchmarks:
•	 Many universities have individual staff ranking systems 
such as UQ’s Q-Index, UWA’s Socratic Index, ECU’s Aspire 
and Curtin’s Research Performance Index. 
•	 Other universities have sought to introduce university-
wide research performance benchmarks or standards 
such as Deakin University, La Trobe University, University 
of Tasmania and Charles Darwin University. 
•	 Other universities have devolved the formation of 
benchmarks, standards or performance measurement 
instruments to their schools and colleges. This includes 
University of Sydney, University of Melbourne, and 
Monash University. 
Performance metrics and benchmarks are intimately tied to 
the employment relationship. In the vast majority of instances 
the establishment of new research performance standards 
has not been based upon staff negotiation or involved staff 
representative bodies such as the NTEU. 
This has led to poor management practices and the develop-
ment of poorly constructed management systems. Research 
performance based on the ERA journal rankings in particular 
is now evident in different institutions in relation to:
•	 Appointments.
•	 Workload models.
•	 Performance appraisal.
•	 Identification for redundancies and voluntary separations.
5.2.1 ERA Journal Rankings
The ERA journal rankings composed one component of 
the ‘dashboard’ of indicators that Research Evaluation 
Committees (REC) used in assessing the quality score of a 
Unit of Evaluation in 2010. With the ARC shifting from the 
‘ERA journal rankings’ to a ‘refined journal indicator’ for 
2012, the list of ERA journal rankings has been abandoned 
and not updated since 2010. The national survey conducted 
about the ERA and research performance asked a question 
about whether the ERA journal rankings had been formally 
abandoned. This was answered by senior administrators in a 
variety of ways. Of the sixteen who responded to the NTEU’s 
question twelve stated they had formally abandoned the 
ERA journal rankings. Nonetheless, where DVC-Rs stated 
that ERA journal rankings were abandoned, there remained 
important questions about how and to what extent this 
information was circulated across the university community. 
The fact that numerous focus group participants assumed 
that the ERA journal rankings were still in operation in spite 
of their formal abandonment in May 2011 is not particularly 
strange, not only because the quality of communication 
about the ERA has been inconsistent amongst various 
institutions, but because it is clear that the ERA journal 
rankings have sustained a range of informal and formal 
uses, either amongst academics and discipline groups as 
a proxy for quality journals, or residually through practices 
imposed by institutions, including through incorporation into 
operational plans, performance standards and statements 
attached to individual performance review. As stated by one 
participant, Jill, “All that A* stuff doesn’t apply anymore. 
Not unless management is telling you to”. Likewise, a more 
senior academic, Judy, claimed, “In my department we have 
to say if we’re going to mention the rankings, we say former 
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rankings. A DVC told me that, ‘Even though we don’t go by 
the rankings, we all know what they’re worth’.” 
Numerous participants reported the continued listing of ERA 
journal rankings in CVs attached to university applications 
for appointment and promotion. Others stated that use of 
the ERA journal rankings were not uncommonly discussed in 
relation to research performance at faculty or departmental 
meetings. Some reported that depending upon individual 
scholars, collaborative planning around intended 
publications could commonly involve explicit references to 
journals ranked in the A or A* categories. The most extreme 
informal use of the ERA journal rankings was on an offshore 
campus, where staff performance according to research 
funding applications and proportion of publications based 
on the ERA journal rankings were posted on a common room 
Leaderboard.
Some academics stated that they were being informally 
encouraged by peers to modify or change the nature of their 
research interests based upon the proportion of old A* and 
A journals that existed for different four digit codes. Lance 
reported this as a kind of ‘topic narrowing’:
LANCE: Basically it was being heavily hinted that we 
might want to shift (our research interest) to a 
neighbouring four digit code where there were 
more A stars. We performed poorly at our FoR. 
That’s at this university, but it’s also because 
we had a grand total of X journals (in our FoR) 
to choose from. In the neighbouring FoR you 
have more than four times. So basically the 
emphasis was move your disciplinary interest 
to a more opportune field if you want to have 
A stars. 
Lesley, a research manager, suggested that the continued 
use of ERA journal rankings at one institution was augmented 
by a university-wide software program that aggregated 
the university’s research output based upon ERA journal 
rankings in 2010, but continued to allow this during the 2012 
assessment exercise: 
LESLEY: The trouble is that once these lists are created 
they have a certain meaning. And so at this 
institution they created a piece of software that 
had all of the publications from this university 
ranked. If I’d look up Jennifer, I would see that 
a particular journal is an A star, and ‘another 
particular one is a B. All of that information 
is in front of me. Different universities would 
have done different things, but this university 
was extraordinarily well organised. Now the 
point is that the list was quite legitimate in the 
first time round. The trouble is when it came 
to ERA 2012 the list was still kind of kept, 
because there wasn’t another list… The same 
piece of software would still show what that 
journal was last time around, and people still 
used that nomenclature. So although the list 
was highly criticised, and the ARC withdrew 
it… it’s still considered.
Though some participants reported on the ARC’s rejection 
of discovery and linkage grant applications that included 
references to the ERA journal rankings, participants who 
were involved in ERA peer review and ARC assessments 
considered that the continued use of ERA journal rankings in 
applications was common.  
It became clear that the informal use of the ERA journal 
rankings could hardly be considered controversial when there 
was such common formal use from institutions themselves. 
As explained by Sam, ‘How are you going to evaluate what 
they’ve done if you don’t use rankings, when rankings are in 
- this is a central university document?  If that’s in the central 
university area, why would you not use rankings?’ 
In terms of the formal use of ERA journal rankings, evidence 
was provided that these have been incorporated into: 
•	 The metrics developed by institutions to measure research 
performance of staff.
•	 Benchmarks or standards of research performance 
augmented at the university or faculty-wide level.
•	 Individual performance reviews, and documents such as 
statements of expectation. 
These kinds of uses of ERA journal rankings can be 
distinguished in these contexts. The first is for the purposes 
of establishing a minimum publication expectation defined 
through reference to the ERA journal ranking list. This was 
often connected to the definition of ‘research active’ or the 
basis to acquire a proportion of research allocation. 
The second was in terms of providing financial incentives 
for A* and A publications, with departments or faculties 
providing additional in-kind, and in certain instances 
monetary, support to research staff for each A* or A journal 
publication. As stated by Sam: 
SAM: Going back to the basics, everybody in the 
department who is rated as a researcher gets 
a base amount of money to research. So 
somebody who is a lecturer or an Associate 
Professor, they all get a base amount of money 
for them to do their research. And then on top 
of that they get an amount of money when 
they evidence they’ve actually had some 
output. I’m loath to use the word ‘reward for 
performance’ because it sounds like, well, 
anything will do. We’re talking about in the 
ERA rankings B, A star and A journals. So 
you’re only talking X journals in our code that 
you’re going to get any money for. It’s pretty 
tough to get.
The third was defined by more explicit impositions upon 
freedom of intellectual inquiry, through university documents 
that sought to codify expectations about the number 
of B and C star journal publications permitted for each 
researcher. One such faculty document provided a certain 
number of fractional points for research outputs based on 
the abandoned ERA journal rankings, for which B and C 
journals attracted fewer points. The document also clearly 
states that the allocation of points ends at a certain number 
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of publications in the B and C rankings. Scott was highly 
critical of such a practice:
SCOTT:  I’ve published in a widely read journal that 
is ranked B. It was a good article that has 
triggered ongoing discussion in my discipline. 
It said something new about something that 
mattered. However, because it was a B journal 
it has used up a quarter of my quota of B and 
C journals for the next six years! Apparently, 
one can apply for special permission to publish 
above your allotted quota, but clearly, the 
position is that B and C publications are a bad 
outcome for the department, and thus for you 
as an individual. This (is) an absurd situation, but 
I would emphasise that it is primarily the fault of 
the ARC for setting the signals and incentives 
to produce this type of outcome.
For workplaces where the ERA journal rankings had been 
abandoned, there was often an acknowledgment that this 
provided opportunities to demonstrate the quality of a 
researcher’s publication record framed by other quality 
indicators such as the Thomson ISI or H-index, or even purely 
by the intended target audience. 
5.2.2 Field of Research (FoR) codes 
as disciplines
The Field of Research (FoR) codes were originally established 
by the ARC to provide some administrative certainty to the 
allocation of research grant applications to its peer reviewers, 
a task that precedes the existence of the ERA and, aside from 
seeking to cover the breadth of possible university research, 
does not construct itself as definitive of existing discipline 
groupings.  
One major implication in the manipulation of the ERA process 
was that following the 2012 ERA National Report, the ERA 
scores in Units of Evaluation were taken up by particular 
institutions as a basis to judge the quality of research in 
disciplinary areas, or even to reallocate funding or to target 
for restructuring. In light of the expansion of managerial 
processes that establish internal competition through the 
introduction of internal markets this is not entirely surprising. 
However, the limited coherency between FoR codes and 
the school or departmental structure of any institution for 
particular disciplines has dangerous implications for the 
quality of research:  
DAVID: It’s my understanding that where you had 
certain outputs hived off into other codes 
rather than the one discipline, or whatever 
was thought was appropriate, it had an impact 
on the ranking, the overall ERA ranking of that 
particular discipline because a lot of their work 
was counted in others...
REBECCA: But they’re not disciplines…
JANINE: They’re not disciplines.
DAVID: … or FoRs or whatever the case may be, yes.
JANINE: The ERA scores don’t rank according to 
discipline.
REBECCA: No, but again, people do – they rank it.
BARBARA: That’s right, yes. I think the importance of 
what’s happened is certainly at a senior level. 
Something I often argue against is the talk 
about a discipline code as if it is a discipline, 
which is ludicrous.
This could leave research areas that were predominantly 
interdisciplinary, or that did not match well against a limited 
number of FoR codes, at the margins when internal decisions 
about research investment and support were determined on 
the basis of the university’s ERA scores. As participants at 
one off-main campus focus group stated:
BARRY: Because a lot of the publications, as Francis 
mentioned, just got siphoned off. I publish in 
a science discipline as well as public health. 
So all of mine are actually counting to what 
this discipline at the main campus would claim 
as their publications, when in fact they actually 
belong here with me.
LEE: So it’s fine if you’re a nice, neat academic 
unit, like you’re a psychology department 
and you want to know how you’ve done, but 
for anything that’s multidisciplinary you are 
heavily disadvantaged because (your research 
output) gets split.
BARRY: But even in departments like that, even in 
psychology, I might still publish in journals that 
are related to science but wouldn’t necessarily 
be scientific. Some of those might even come 
under sciences - I think that the splintering of 
output just makes it very murky.
In one instance, the perception that a departmental structure 
could be aligned to an FoR code led to fairly important 
constraints placed upon the scope of scholarly publication. 
As claimed by Lance:
LANCE:  I’d also suggest that in my disciplinary area 
we are being told to publish to a specific line 
in the ERA group, one of the FoR categories. 
We are discouraged from publishing in the 
remaining categories, and then being found 
to be research inactive or poor researchers 
because we are actually only playing to an 
internal view of one of those five options. The 
university still gets paid for all five, but if you 
are sufficiently dumb to publish outside your 
little box, the university gets rewarded but 
you don’t. And I’d say that we’ve been told to 
publish in this category whereas there’s more 
research available (in others). 
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At another institution, one research manager, Sam, 
demonstrated how an institutional imperative to tie FoR 
codes to departmental structures could cause unfair 
disadvantage to some disciplines compared to others:   
SAM: Because we are a standalone discipline, 
anything that’s not X (FoR) doesn’t help us. So 
we’ve got professors and associate professors 
and all sorts of people who publish across the 
board. For every journal that they publish in 
outside of our department, it’s not helping us 
because the publications are counted. Let’s 
just say there’s 100. But if 25 of those are not 
in our discipline that’s 25 that can’t be counted, 
but we still have been told, ‘Well, you’ve got Y 
number of journals’. ...So we would be better 
off we were the department of blah with a sub 
discipline for our department because this 
other discipline has several hundred journals. 
We could claim all of those journals as being 
in our area. That would mean that a lot more 
of our staff would have more opportunities to 
publish. If you’ve only got Y number of journals 
to publish - you can start doing the stats.
The outcome of this kind of logic is a competition for scarce 
funding between academic units within an institution, not 
only for the scarce funding that might be allocated through 
a funding instrument like the SRE, but the internal support 
of the central financial and planning groups within the 
university, such as the Vice-Chancellery, in an environment 
in which restructures and the revision of strategic plans are 
affected by annual variations in student demand. 
5.3 Workplace implications of 
increasing competition on 
research performance
Auranen and Nieminen provided warnings about the 
excessive reliance upon quasi-market instruments and the 
success of funding incentives for research performance. 
They argued that ‘the idea of output and competition-
based incentives promoting productivity in science is more 
complex than policy-makers seem to believe. Even though 
the countries with a competitive funding environment for 
university research (the UK, Australia and Finland) appear 
more efficient than the rest, they have not been able to 
increase their efficiency in publication output’.111 They 
pointed out that university systems with less competitive 
funding environments are either almost as efficient (Denmark) 
or have been able to increase their efficiency despite low 
levels of competition for funding (Sweden and Germany). 
Others such as Hicks have warned about the dangers of a 
highly unstable or unreliable funding system if competition 
in fact means that research funding can be removed from 
underperforming universities.112 
Certain elements of the adaptation undertaken by universities 
to the ERA infer significant risks to the sustainability of publicly 
funded research undertaken by Australian universities, and 
these perceptions are already evident and well articulated 
in the perceptions of university staff. Common concerns 
related to: 
•	 The detrimental effects upon academic freedom and the 
depth and breadth of Australian research.
•	 The privileging of research over teaching through 
performance funding being attributed exclusively to 
research.
•	 New barriers to sustaining research training in Australia 
caused by institutions anticipating the link between 
the ERA and the RTS, including administrators making 
decisions about the capacity to support prospective HDR 
students, not on the basis of the existence of supervisors 
with appropriate expertise,  but because of concentrations 
of research performance. 
Nonetheless, to focus this section, the major adverse 
implications that will be portrayed explore institution-based 
managerialism that has resulted from the intensification of 
research performance.
5.3.1 Performance knowledge 
hierarchies
One of the key consequences is the deepening of 
performance knowledge hierarchies which situate senior 
administrators and research managers at the centre of the 
research ecosystem, and with researchers who were once 
otherwise largely and autonomously responsible for the 
creation and publication of research are pushed further to 
the periphery. To begin with, this is mediated by changes in 
the rules and procedures of external bodies such as the ARC 
and DIISRTE, meaning that from assessment to assessment, 
refinements in the methodology need to be understood 
in terms of the institution’s submission. In addition, the 
imposition of internal research performance expectations 
occurs hierarchically, even when this is devolved to the faculty 
level, and is often mediated by select groups responsible for 
strategic research investment or budget allocation within the 
university. 
Another consideration is the fact that the quality of 
communication shared amongst researchers tends to 
be implicit and informal, not only because the means 
of communication are often poor but because some 
institutions have dampened information about the ERA 
assessment – sometimes with the intent of preventing or 
minimising researcher game-playing, sometimes to limit 
knowledge about the adaptive behaviours and practices of 
the institution. 
Most importantly, the creation of scores as a proxy for 
quality effectively replaces the peer evaluation that would 
originate from other experts. These are useful not only 
for non-experts in other disciplinary fields but for non-
academics altogether, who may be involved with making 
judgements about performance or strategic investment. 
As considered by Rebecca, ‘That’s the danger of it that 
you turn very complicated things into very simple things 
that people latch onto and use’, or as stated by Francis, ‘I 
think it’s because it’s easier to count frankly. I think it comes 
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down to the government wanting - and I think it did come 
from the government and then it’s been passed down 
through the university, at a policy level, that they wanted 
something quick, and simple, and easy, to define quality and 
enforce a system based on that’.  As a consequence, with 
the increasing competition around research performance, 
researchers are becoming de-professionalised, and the 
freedom of intellectual pursuit established through an 
institution’s culture of research is increasingly subjugated to 
the imperatives of research concentration. This was evident 
in Carol’s concerns:
CAROL:  When that filters down to producing research 
as an individual academic, there’s a kind 
of a downgrading of what you do, and an 
inability to compete for achievements that are 
hooked into promotion and work performance 
measures by management at universities.  So 
even though it starts off as the government 
trying to, say, prioritise particular areas such 
as sciences, what it actually does is have a 
real effect on the ground on how individual 
academics can materialise what they need to 
be able to go for promotion.
5.3.2 Research performance 
benchmarks
In the efforts of institutions to lift research productivity 
with the creation of minimum benchmarks or standards, 
universities are often imposing conditions and expectations 
on the application and promotion expectations laid out in 
union collective agreements or existing university promotion 
policies. Whether these benchmarks in fact satisfy the 
purposes for which they are established is less demonstrable, 
according to the perspectives of many participants. In 
institutions where this has been established, participants 
commented on the lack of provision for professional 
development for staff who did not reach the stipulated 
benchmarks. Others commented that the benchmarks were 
not sufficiently low to ensure that the majority of staff were 
performing at that level, and thus were in fact an alternative 
means to discipline staff. As suggested by Ross:
ROSS: It’s explicit. It’s in documents. It’s on our 
websites. Almost no one lives up to it. Almost 
everyone lives in fear. And I think that’s the 
point. The point is to have the bar raised so 
high that almost no one lives up to it. ...It’s 
also a way of resolving conflict. If you have a 
conflict over an issue that has nothing to do 
with (performance) and you appeal it to the 
Dean. And then the Dean still doesn’t get back 
to me and it goes to HR. Our documents say at 
that point that HR will have recourse to these 
minimum publication outputs as to whether or 
not to provide support to staff. …This may not 
be an academic issue. This could be an issue of 
whether you deserve to take your vacation this 
month or not. Whatever it might be this is a real 
misuse of publication rankings. 
What this ultimately represents is an insidious use of the 
ERA, impacting on researcher behaviours in an arena which 
is meant to be free from market incentives. This means 
researchers are compelled for professional and career 
purposes to be interested in shaping and impacting upon 
the way their research contribution to the ERA is described. 
As stated by Glaser and Laudel, ‘The two major conditions 
of action that drive researchers’ behaviour are the tenure 
and promotion policies and the conditions of applications 
for external grants. Researchers need publications to get 
grants, and they need publications and grants to get tenure 
and to get promoted. These powerful incentives form a cycle 
of their own which is relatively independent of the RES’.113
On the basis that universities are locked into a competitive 
struggle to lift research capacity, and that many research 
active or research intensive staff are looking for greater 
clarity about career progress, the NTEU believes there 
should be explicit underpinning considerations that frame 
performance benchmarks. On the basis of this study, research 
performance standards or benchmarks should include the 
following principles:
•	 Fit for purpose (the vast majority i.e. 95% of staff must 
already satisfy these requirements).
•	 Staff negotiated.
•	 Career progress and research opportunity sensitive.
•	 Able to detail the professional development that will 
assist staff who have not achieved these performance 
expectations.
•	 Consistent with the principles of intellectual freedom of 
inquiry.
•	 Consistent with the industrial agreement and all other legal 
requirements binding the tertiary education institution.
5.3.3 Performance-focused staff 
conversions
There are many inadvertent ways in which early career 
pathways have been affected by the intensification of research 
performance, but an important one is through universities 
seeking to alter the proportion of active researchers at that 
institution, either through restructures, or the conversion of 
staff out of ‘research active’ positions. This is in part being 
driven by research funding, which is calculated on a per 
‘research active’ (or research only and research and teaching 
academic) staff basis. 
It emerged in the focus groups and interviews that at 
some institutions academic and research staff were being 
converted to HEW positions. As stated by Jill:
JILL: This is something that’s happening 
progressively with quite a few of us in our 
centre, sort of one or two here or there, you 
know. A while back (the directors) moved 
all our RAs onto the HEW scale. Gradually 
they’re catching up with the rest of us. But my 
directors met with someone from HR central, 
I don’t know who, and said, ‘Look, is there 
anything we can do about this? What’s going 
on?’ And they were just told, ‘You’ve got no 
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choice. This is what’s happening and it’s just 
got to happen’. So there was no kind of debate 
about the merits of, you know, demoralising 
all the staff and the implications for the staff. It 
was just, you know, ‘This is what the university 
is doing, you don’t have a choice’.
Where conversion into teaching only positions may in fact have 
legitimate purposes in relation to the actual role performed 
by staff, the conversion of academics into professional staff 
positions involves much greater institutional risk. These kinds 
of managerial practices produce new kinds of reputational 
risk, particularly where the position descriptions of HEW staff 
ignored the fact that those staff were involved in academic 
work such as teaching, course coordination, data collection 
and the supervision of HDR students:
KERRY: I was flicked over at the commencement of my 
contract in 2010 and that was still true to the 
academic job. Then when I had the new casual 
contract, it just said administrative duties, even 
though I’m not doing administrative duties. I 
mean, it’s part of my job, but I do fieldwork, 
data collection, all that sort of stuff, ‘Oh yes 
but’. What is always is put to you, ‘Oh yes, but 
you know it’s just easier for us to put it through 
to this. It will take forever. We’ve got to do, 
this, this’. It’s always just excuses. Always an 
excuse as to why the PD won’t necessarily 
match your job which is usually that, ‘It would 
take too long. We might have to advertise it 
externally if we do that.’ 
JILL: That’s exactly what they say every time we 
have to do a job description in our unit.
LEAH: That’s right and I have real problems signing a 
PD that doesn’t have any relationship to what 
I’m doing, particularly when it misrepresents me 
in terms of what the classification should be. 
In such circumstances, there are also career implications 
that reduce the attractiveness of a university-based research 
career. The harshness of these arrangements were further 
discussed by this group:
SARAH: The other person that I teach the Masters 
subject with is in the same position. She’s 
been forced over onto the HEW scale, and HR 
have said to her ‘Look, sorry, you are going to 
be financially disadvantaged, because of the 
level that you were on, on the academic scale. 
We can’t’. I think they could match it the first 
year, but then she’s (had) nowhere to go.
JILL: If they match it, you don’t get the scheduled 
pay rises until the pay levels overtake where 
you’re matched at, so you stop getting pay 
rises immediately until they catch up.
KERRY: That’s right, and that’s what happened to a 
colleague of mine who’s actually been doing 
the same job for more than five years but on 
a one-year renewal basis. There’s no excuse 
because it’s recurrent funding. This situation 
happened too and (my colleague) said, ‘Oh 
yes, but it’s a new contract’. So after her 
transfer, after that contract concluded and 
when she questioned why she was getting a 
salary decrease, she was told, ‘Oh yes, but it’s 
a new contract’. It’s that catch up thing until 
the level over time matches.
Reducing the number of research active staff did not affect 
ERA scores, as this was calculated on the basis of research 
output. Nonetheless, the importance of this phenomenon 
arose in relation to the distribution of the SRE funding, with 
the allocation formula preceding the introduction of an 
Excellence Index (Ei) dividing research output (or weighted 
publications) by the number of what have been called 
‘research active’ staff.
5.3.4 Nourishing managerialism
Managerialism has a range of tacit meanings within tertiary 
education but it is most often defined by attempts to 
impose managerial techniques associated with ‘for profit’ 
businesses onto public sector and voluntary organisations. 
Managerialism infers a range of workplace-based techniques 
including ‘the use of internal cost centres, the fostering 
of competition between employees, the marketisation 
of public sector services, and the monitoring of efficiency 
and effectiveness through measurement of outcomes and 
individual staff performances’.114 
To a number of participants, the power of central planning 
and funding bodies in monitoring and changing performance 
expectations around research were the most important 
adverse outcomes of the ERA. Dale, a senior research 
manager, for instance, raised the reduction of harm as one 
of his key concerns and managerialism as an unintended 
consequence of the ERA assessment: 
DALE:  The intention is very noble but like any attempt 
to measure (a) social system, inevitably it seems 
that this is a moving target. From the moment 
that you use measurement, the behaviour 
of the species changes, because they know 
they’re being observed. They know that they’re 
being measured and as a result (you) have a 
feedback (loop). That happened, as you’re well 
aware, and the ranking of journals came back 
as an unexpected consequence in changing 
the behaviours all across Australia. Academics 
are being rewarded with money, with financial 
incentives to change their behaviour, and 
the way that they publish. That was totally 
unexpected. And in all fairness to the 
government, they did try to rectify that in 2012 
when they saw that. But I want to emphasise 
that these kinds of games of (on the one hand) 
trying to measure yourself, seriously measure 
yourself, and (on the other hand) measuring a 
social system (where) there is feedback loops, 
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(this) is a very vicious form that I don’t think 
is easily resolvable. I can see that. I’ve talked 
to a lot of academics on campus. I can see 
the pain in their faces. I can see the anguish 
whenever promotion is coming up. But until 
we’ve actually worked out a better way, or a 
more thoughtful way that we can do this thing 
of measuring ourselves, in all seriousnesss, (the 
best thing) is to try to minimise that feedback 
loop and the disruption created as a result. I 
don’t have the answers, but at the coalface of 
the bureaucrats in this institution, I can see two 
sides of the story.
Other researchers, particularly a number in biomedical fields 
looking at translational research, described how precariously 
support for research quality depended upon expert peer 
judgment and open-minded research management, in the 
context of ARC grant applications and in faculty support. 
One scientist highlighted how the emphasis on performance 
indicators such as research income was detrimental to his 
own research, which did not require large sums of money 
for testing. Another scientist, Ian, in explaining the different 
kinds of research conducted by the university, emphasised 
that the ERA should not become the determinant of the 
university’s research budget:
IAN:  To measure something you have to be put into 
a little category. It really depends how much 
weighting is given to the ERA, relative to the 
other things, because in our field, to make the 
transformational discoveries, we have to work 
with the physicists, and the chemists, and the 
mathematicians. ERA doesn’t encourage that 
necessarily. So we do that, and we would 
do that anyhow, but there’s the strength of 
the discipline and then there’s also what you 
might call the grand challenges of research. 
The grand challenges have to be done to 
a large extent collaboratively. If you’re a 
pharmacologist, you have to have a discipline 
in pharmacology, but if you want to work 
on novel ways of cancer therapy you don’t 
work alone. You may work with a radiologist, 
and that means with the physicists, with the 
chemists, the mathematicians. So you can do 
clinical trials on smaller numbers of patients, 
all those sort of things. I don’t think they’re 
contradictory, but you just have to make sure 
that ERA is not the determinant of the budget 
at the university.
From the perspective of others, managerialism and the 
embedding of managerial cultures was a key outcome of an 
environment increasingly focused on the intensification of 
research performance. As claimed by Travis:  
TRAVIS:  Managerialism uses ERA as a justification for 
the things it wants to do. One example, one 
of our Schools had a kind of a ‘spill and fill’ 
and they chose to say that you have to have 
a PhD in order to re-apply for your job, and 
the justification for having a PhD is you have 
to ultimately have the potential to become 
research active or engage in research and 
teaching. It’s absolutely ridiculous to think of 
this particular school requiring a PhD, and 
indeed 20 years ago the university agreed 
it would never do that. Now I don’t mind 
these things in one way. I disagree with them 
profoundly, but what I don’t agree with is ERA 
providing another rung in a ladder to step 
in the direction you don’t want to go, and I 
assume (the fact) that it plays into the hands of 
managerialism is an unintended consequence.
The perception of participants was generally that these kinds 
of managerial instruments were poorly designed and lacking 
robust justification:
BARBARA:  We do have a sledgehammer approach to 
most things, you know.  There are a few 
people who are not going to function well, 
but we’ve set up a whole system… The major 
systems that are put in place are to manage 
a few people. If we actually said, ‘Look, most 
people (are) fine, and let’s identify the ones 
that need some help and either improve their 
thing, or help them out if that’s not the right 
place for them’.
KATE:  I think it’s based on this idea that if everybody 
says, ‘All we want is excellent research’ then 
somehow you can turn human beings into 
excellent researchers. All human beings 
are not excellent researchers.  All human 
beings are not excellent academics. We’re a 
community of scholars. Some will be better 
than others. What you want to do is support 
the environment to grow people as best as 
possible. But you don’t spend your time trying 
to weed out (the weakest), or spend all your 
accountability time, all your management 
resources, on finding the ones that aren’t 
doing their job well enough and forgetting to 
support the 90 per cent who are.
DAVID:  You don’t set up systems to demoralise your 
staff, in psychological terms, to encourage 
staff to think less of the institution that 
they’re working for. You want people to 
psychologically invest in it, to not see it as 
a place that constantly hits them over the 
head, and convey a message that they’re 
not trustworthy and they can’t be depended 
upon.  We have to have all these systems to 
monitor and control them, and that they’re 
basically r incompetent or lazy or nasty or what 
have you. ...I mean that’s a very bad message 
to send to employees.  It’s just an outrageous 
personnel practice, and at odds with what 
anyone in management would say is the way 
to run a large complex organisation, where 
your most important resource should be your 
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human resources, and you should value them 
rather than hit them over the head.
An important qualification about the significance of the ERA 
is that, even without the ERA or SRE, other research block 
funding programs that support performance indicators would 
remain. In discussion with a number of senior administrators, 
their conversations with central planning and finance about 
research performance of their departments, schools and 
faculties were more often related to indicators expressed 
through the Joint Research Engagement (JRE) scheme or 
current RTS, such as research income, student load, HDR 
student completions, and publications benchmarked against 
other quality indicators such as the Thomson’s ISI or the 
H-Index. The variable relevance of the ERA scores in terms 
of publication was reflected in diverse rationales imposed by 
universities: 
BARBARA: We’re given two messages… from the 
university. One is we’ve got the HERDC 
dataset and we get more money from their 
publications. So the more publications we 
get from HERDC, the more money we bring 
in. And then we’ve got this other thing (the 
ERA) which is about quality. So we’re giving 
two messages to staff. We’re saying to them, 
‘Write as much as you can, because we get 
more money if you write more’ and ‘Don’t 
write in the wrong journals, get quality’.  
SAM:  So this is part of the problem. It’s not only (that) 
the university is marching to two different 
drums; HERDC and ERA - and of course their 
own agenda - but you’ve also got faculties 
then interpreting and making requirements 
which are even harder sometimes.
Lesley reported that the majority of processes related to 
research performance at her institution were established 
before the ERA:
LESLEY: What’s interesting sitting over here is, of 
course, that I was involved in ERA from the 
first second. What’s interesting is that actually 
listening to Jennifer’s account, for example - 
because of ERA there are now these measures. 
This is (about) how many things you have 
to produce, and so on, whereas in fact that 
had already happened. That wasn’t actually 
connected with ERA. Things happen in the 
same time period, and the thing that everyone 
hears about, because everyone rattles on 
about it all the time, is that we came first in 
Australia in this discipline, blah, blah, blah. So 
ERA is out front (because at the moment we’ve 
done well), but in fact all the measures about 
how many things you must produce were in 
place anyway. 
The problem in terms of any recommendation about the 
ERA assessment exercise is the potential conflation of 
the existence of the ERA assessment instrument and the 
behaviours and practices that have developed in order to 
intensify the quality of research performance understood 
through ERA scores and indicators. 
In terms of an overarching analysis, it is clear that the 
introduction of any research assessment system would 
have fundamentally changed the behaviour of universities, 
in the same way that the Research Quantum’s ‘Composite 
Index’ did in the mid-1990s. Game playing is a fundamental 
implication of setting standardised rules and developing 
proxies of research quality and performance. Furthermore, 
now that it has been introduced the residual influence of 
the ERA on the sector’s behaviour will remain profound 
whether it is repeated or not. The next point, however, is 
that the incentives to ‘game play’ for universities are both 
reputational and economic.115 As stated by Dale: 
DALE:  There are these two aspects of ERA. One 
is financial. One is reputational. And since 
the release of the results of 2010, certainly 
the university had to look at the result very 
carefully, in terms of divvying up the money 
that we got from the Federal government, the 
SRE money.  All I can describe is this. There’s 
a dogfight going on amongst the schools 
to get the biggest share of SRE money. So 
make no mistakes about it, this is a finite sum, 
again, when it comes to money, everyone is 
interested in getting their share.
As argued by Hicks, reputational competition is considered by 
many New Public Management (NPM) scholars as sufficient 
to drive behaviour towards greater research intensity and 
selectivity.116 Competition for funding allocation predominantly 
enlarges the incentive and prerogative for universities to 
centrally direct resources. As a result, research concentration 
becomes about not only enlarging investment in particular 
areas of the university, but also divesting others. 
On this basis, institutions have and will continue to alter 
and adapt institutional practices to maximise competitive 
advantage. As claimed by Daphne:
DAPHNE: I think no matter what system we have there’ll 
be a (research performance) system. So before 
ERA there were RQFs, and before that there 
were other ways in which we were measured. 
I mean, I was one of the people who fought 
really hard for the recognition and equivalence 
metrics being set up for the creative arts, for 
example, to actually have somewhere that 
linked into the system so (that) those items, 
those creative practices and outputs, are 
actually acknowledged and measured, and 
so on.  That goes back 20 years.  So this stuff 
has been around for a long, long time and I 
presume before that there was other metrics. 
So I think no matter what we do we’re going to 
be measured.  
In interviews it was clear that many individual administrators 
and managers exerted agency to resist the more managerial 
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aspects of institutional processes, or to assist researchers 
in exercising agency in achieving performance goals. 
Nonetheless, the centre of agency in relation to research 
quality is persistently shifted from individual researchers to 
senior university leaders, administrators, heads of schools 
or departments and line-managers. While they may or may 
not exert influence by encouraging competitive behaviour 
between researchers or disciplines, their influence will also 
not always be exerted in a rational way. This has been bluntly 
described by some scholars as managerialism. From the 
research conducted, it is apparent that many academics 
consider it has evolved into something more arbitrary and 
thus much worse.
5.4 What is the institutional 
capacity for minimising risk 
created by adverse research 
performance measures?
It is important to acknowledge that there are many important 
structural factors that limit institutions from assessing and 
minimising risk in relation to managing research performance. 
Firstly, in the Australian context institutions have unhampered 
access to staff information in relation to research output. 
Though the ERA publishes quality scores at the Field 
of Research (FoR) rather than the individual level, each 
institution has the responsibility for collecting and submitting 
data for the ERA submission. Furthermore, there are no 
conditions placed upon eligible institutions in relation to 
the use of this data. In the New Zealand PBRF, the Tertiary 
Education Commission (TEC) takes individual data and 
assigns them ‘Component Scores’ and then a rating in six 
‘Quality Categories’. These scores are described as ‘personal 
information’ by the NZ TEU and provision of this personal 
information to the relevant employer has been interpreted as 
a breach of privacy (without the permission of the individual 
concerned).117 
Secondly, in Australia the outcome of over two decades of 
corporatisation in university research has been the replacement 
of collegial, committee-based models of governance with 
hierarchical management models characterised by increases 
in the number of professional management appointees.118 
In the organisational structures and decision-making bodies 
that have arisen around how institutions plan research 
performance and strategic investment, what is notable is 
the extent to which traditional decision-making bodies such 
as university councils and academic boards have also been 
marginalised and replaced by appointed committees.119 While 
senior administrators often sit on these kinds of committees, 
organisational planning about research performance largely 
mirrors the changing dynamics of university governance and 
the decreasing presence of elected or staff representative 
positions in decision-making fora. This represents an erosion 
of the productive involvement of stakeholders functioning 
within the research system.120 This also means that the 
constituencies represented by decision-makers are often 
focused at institutional or external interests. 
The lack of staff engagement around the development of 
research performance measures was routinely reflected in the 
perspectives of focus group participants. For instance, Sam 
confirmed that researchers were marginalised in decision-
making processes in his faculty;   
SAM:  They’ve not been consulted. There would 
be no need to consult because the faculty 
determines what is ‘research active’… They 
come up with a description, then they take it to 
the Heads of Departments meeting, and they 
discuss it there.  If it’s all agreed - the Heads 
of Departments take it back to their executive 
meeting or whatever forum they have. Report 
back and it all goes through.
In the feedback from participants, the development of 
benchmarks and metrics rarely considered the professional 
interests of those who work under those performance 
accountability processes. 
The concern for the majority of university staff will be that 
the introduction and modification of research performance 
expectations are intimately tied to the employment 
relationship. They will impact significantly upon workplace 
culture and upon the professional and industrial interests 
of university staff. In most instances, the introduction 
of performance benchmarks overlay existing academic 
promotion policies, and, depending upon the wording of the 
collective agreement, may in certain instances be explicitly at 
odds with provisions and clauses about academic promotion 
and performance review in the university’s collective 
agreement. Internal adaptation of ERA requires an industrial 
as much as a policy based response, and in particular the 
development of strategies that will protect the integrity of 
academic promotion and performance review systems.
In an international context, the full extent of university 
adaptation around research performance is being 
progressively addressed, with concerns about the misuse of 
research evaluation systems shared by sister organisations 
in New Zealand and the UK where the operation of highly 
intrusive RES’s are well established. In the UK, the University 
and College Union (UCU) in March 2012 told members that 
‘any assessment of staff contribution should be in relation to 
an agreed set of expectations associated with a job role or 
description, employment contract and academic role profile 
and not in terms of grading exercises such as the REF’.121 In 
NZ, where the Tertiary Education Commission (TEC) is the 
repository for individual PBRF quality scores, the New Zealand 
Tertiary Education Union (TEU) has also issued privacy advice 
to members about limiting instances where a staff member 
believes her or his information is being distributed or used in 
a manner that breaches the TEC guidelines.122
The use of research evaluation indicators as a basis to 
re-profile an institution’s research workforce, to create 
additional performance benchmarks, or to create conditions 
around the conduct of research, is a persistent issue where 
the establishment of research evaluation systems have been 
tied to the allocation of scarce resources. Some expert 
commentators have described the maximisation of resource 
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use on a more limited range of disciplines as ‘specialisation’ 
or ‘differentiation’.123 This poses a concern for professional 
and industrial bodies such as the NTEU, which must ensure 
the interests of researchers and university staff are not 
endangered through the misapplication of ERA indicators. 
This also should pose a challenge to Australian university 
administrators and government policy makers, with the 
emergence of incredibly detrimental modes of adaptation 
that have established new system-wide risks to the conduct 
and quality of Australian research.
The purpose of research quality assessment must in part 
be to ensure that Australia’s systems of research evaluation 
includes the capacity to assess systemic risk, and that 
representative bodies are ensured key roles in identifying 
and preventing misuse of research assessment instruments.
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Media attention surrounding the release of the ERA 2012 
National Report highlighted that the ERA has triggered 
changes in institutional behaviour, including the shift towards 
stronger concentrations of research activity, as was long 
anticipated by the sector.124 This current study highlights that 
there needs to be greater attention to the implications of 
relevant public policy settings and resource allocation for 
the internal culture of universities. The ERA has accelerated 
detrimental changes in relation to research performance, 
impacting upon:
•	 Institutional and management behaviours and practices - 
from the institution-wide down to the intra-departmental 
level, in both formal and informal ways; 
•	 The ways professional associations, disciplinary groups, 
and other groupings that can be generalised as 
‘communities-of-practice’, function; 
•	 The capacity for university staff to exercise not only 
autonomy, but basic precepts of academic freedom; 
•	 Career pathways - ranging from the opportunity for 
graduate students to commence higher degree research 
to the career progress of early to mid-career researchers;
•	 The character, breadth and inter-disciplinarity of Australian 
research, and in demonstrated instances, the prospects 
for translational science and policy-oriented research.
An important factor for policy makers to consider is the extent 
to which resource allocation legitimises poorly considered, 
risk-taking management behaviours. Though reputational 
competition was the primary basis for reinforcing these 
processes and behaviours, the allocation of performance-
based research funding represents a powerful measure that 
can legitimate and entrench institutional misuse. 
The importance of evaluating the effects upon researchers 
and the capacity for research is in part underpinned by 
principles defined through the National Research Investment 
Plan (NRIP).125 The NRIP articulates a reframed approach 
to investment in Australia’s research system, importantly 
highlighting a role for national coordination in building long-
term sustainability of research capacity. It has developed 
a continuum of investment priorities that endorse the full 
spectrum of research. This is expressed through the notion 
of the ‘research fabric’, which looks to research capability in 
five broad and interdependent domains. The description 
of Australia’s system of research as a ‘research fabric’ 
begs questions about the contexts in which principles of 
competition and contestability are suitable, and when they 
might in fact come at the expense of the capacity to support 
breadth, depth and diversity in knowledge creation. 
If we consider, as previously outlined by the OECD, that 
‘serendipity plays a role in scientific and technological 
achievements and that important breakthrough can come 
from unexpected sources’, and also that publicly funded 
research systems ‘need capabilities across a broad spectrum 
of research in order to absorb knowledge generated 
elsewhere and to generate complementary knowledge 
needed to advance innovation in priority areas’, there are 
critical risks for the breadth and diversity of Australian research 
that need to be managed in relation to the exigencies that 
drive institutions towards greater competition.126
This study contends that greater unmediated investment in 
performance-based funding such as SRE and RTS is likely to 
exaggerate managerialism. This is likely to undermine both 
the credibility and confidence held by the sector in ERA, 
as well as the capacity of the Australian tertiary education 
sector to sustain its research performance. The management 
of these risks can be assisted by funding incentives for 
sustainable and responsible management practices. 
Notions of sustainable research quality might look to fewer 
metrics-based performance indicators, they might focus 
on benchmarks through identifying best practice systems, 
or more appropriate input factors such as investment in 
professional development programs and output factors such 
as the extent of involuntary staff turnover. 
Institutional adaptation to the ERA measures of research 
performance are likely to have profound effects on Australian 
universities and the character of Australian research, long 
before 2015 when the next ERA has been proposed.127 The 
research demonstrates that the measurement of research 
performance undermines basic precepts of intellectual 
freedom. A key principle in the rules and expectations around 
the conduct of publicly funded research should be that 
university academics and researchers must be supported to 
conduct research in academic disciplines they have expertise 
in, and in an environment in which freedom of intellectual 
inquiry is encouraged and protected. Just as important is 
the need to build greater clarity amongst researchers about 
the ERA. Stronger communication strategies will ensure 
individual researchers approach the adaptation of particular 
institutions with factual and reliable information about the 
ERA and SRE’s design and policy intent. 
The assessment of risk in relation to the misuse of performance 
indicators used to measure research quality should be an 
explicit component of research quality assessment. With 
changes to the governance of universities over the last 
twenty years the role of the NTEU as the industrial advocate 
and representative of university staff and other regulatory 
bodies is required to ensure independent oversight of the 
implications for the sector and Australia’s capacity to build 
and sustain its research efforts.
Conclusion: Managing the risk to 
Australia’s research future
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In light of the many concerns expressed by participants 
in this study, the NTEU cannot entertain support for any 
performance based funding implications flowing from 
the ERA. It is not in the interests of the sector to support 
additional funding tied to the ERA unless it is confident that 
government has established strong disincentives against 
detrimental behaviours and practices that are already 
damaging the character, breadth and inter-disciplinarity 
of Australian research, damaging Australian universities as 
workplaces, and undermining the professional interests and 
employment conditions of university and research staff. 
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Appendix A: Survey questions to senior administrators on ERA 
and research performance (23 April 2012)
1. Has your institution issued any formal communication to academic or research staff, or implemented university-wide policy 
changes that acknowledge the ERA journal rankings have been formally abandoned?
2. Does your university continue to use journal rankings (ERA or alternative) in relation to the professional development or 
career progress of academic or research staff? 
3. Does your university administer research metrics to assess the performance of academic or research staff?  If so:
i. What metrics are used? 
ii. Do they vary by faculty or discipline?
4. Does your university set specific performance targets for these measures for:
•	 appointment 
•	 probation 
•	 performance management 
•	 promotion
Appendix B: Discussion points for focus group participants 
1. Purpose of ERA:
•	 What is ERA and what do you understand it is meant to do?
2. Quality of information about ERA:
•	 Do you think the quality of information you receive from your university about ERA is adequate?
3. ERA journal rankings:
•	 How much emphasis does the academic unit you work in place on ERA journal rankings?
4. Universities and research metrics:
•	 How does your university manage research performance and what purpose do ERA journal rankings play?
•	 What other ways has ERA impacted upon the way the university operates?
5. Implications of ERA:
•	 What are the key implications of ERA for your professional interests as an academic or researcher?
•	 What effect will ERA have upon the Australian higher education sector in the long term?
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